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THE CONCEPT OF STATEHOOD IN
UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE *
ROSALYN COHEN t
The topic of "statehood under international law" has long been
a favorite with jurists. The problem of what constitutes a "state" has
been extensively examined and discussed, but all too often in absolutist
terms confined to drawing up lists of criteria which must be met before
an entity may be deemed a "state." The very rigidity of this approach
implies that the term "state" has a fixed meaning which provides
an unambiguous yardstick for measuring without serious fear of
error, the existence of international personality. The framework of
examination being thus constricted, traditional inquiry has endeavored
to meet some of its inadequacies by ancillary discussions on the possi-
bility of a "dependent state" in international law, of the desirability of
universality in certain organizations set up by the international com-
munity, and of the rights of peoples to national self-determination.
It would appear, however, that these questions, far from being ancillary,
are integral to any discussion of "statehood." Even the language of
the law-or perhaps especially the language of the law-contains
ambiguities which are inherent in any language system, and the diffi-
culties presented by this fact can only be resolved by an analysis which
takes full cognizance of the contextual background. Thus, when ex-
amining what is meant by the word "state," an appraisal of the com-
munity interests which will be affected by the decision to interpret it
in one way rather than in another is necessary. Discussions, for
example, of whether a "dependent state" can exist under international
law become meaningless unless there is first an examination of whether
the community of nations would find it appropriate, in the light of its
long range objectives, to afford the rights which follow from "state-
hood" to entities fettered by restrictions which impair their independ-
ence. Consideration must also be given to whether some forms of
dependency may give rise to an affirmative answer to this question,
and others to a negative answer. It is equally necessary to emphasize
* The author wishes to express her sincere gratitude to Professor Myres S.
McDougal, of Yale Law School, and to Dr. Oscar Schachter, Director in the Office
of Legal Affairs, the United Nations, for their encouragement and advice during the
preparation of this Article. The views contained in this Article, however, do not
necessarily reflect their own.
I B.A. 1958, LL.B. 1959, Cambridge; Commonwealth Fund Fellow at Yale
University Law School.
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that the decision-maker here is the community at large rather than any
one state. We are concerned, in trying to give meaningful content to
the term "state," with the interests of mankind in conducting an
ordered, regulated, peaceful society, in which individual liberties and
human dignity may be promoted.
The principles upon which the United Nations is founded reflect
the interests of the general community, since that organization consists
of the vast majority of entities which have been generally recognized
as full members of the international community. The political organs
of the United Nations ' have the authority to admit applicants to
membership in that organization, subject, inter alia, to the condition
that the applicant be a state. In interpreting this term all the con-
siderations mentioned above must be taken into account. At the
same time, these organs must consider certain policy problems specifi-
cally relevant to the United Nations which cannot be resolved merely
by reference to the other prerequisites of admission: those of being
"peace-loving" and "able and willing" to fulfill the obligations of the
Charter. These problems will be refined and discussed below.
In performing the very difficult task of interpreting the juridical
criteria of statehood-criteria which are less well defined than is com-
monly thought-the political organs of the United Nations may be
called upon to play several different roles. They may be entrusted
with the task of regulating membership in the United Nations itself
or in its specialized agencies, or of regulating the appearance of entities
before its own organs under the provisions of the Charter or before the
International Court of Justice. Consequently, not only do community
goals have to be taken into consideration as keys to the interpretation
of the criteria of statehood, but so do the various claims and tasks
to which the acknowledgment of statehood is relevant.
It is a fashionable view among both lawyers and political scientists
that the political organs of the United Nations have completely ignored
juridical criteria when they have been called upon to assess statehood,
and that they have granted or withheld recognition of statehood solely
on political grounds which have borne little relation to community
interests. This view is most dubious, and would appear to arise from
an inadequate appreciation of contextual factors and an overemphasis
on the so-called "package deal" as representative of United Nations
practice. Further, legal criteria are open to differing interpretations
without giving rise to the charge of mala fides, and there is some
evidence that variations in interpretation have not been capricious or
'I.e., those organs performing a prescribing function, namely, the General As-
sembly, Security Council, Trusteeship Council, Economic and Social Council, and
Secretariat.
STATEHOOD IN UNITED IVATIONS PRACTICE
arbitrary, but have followed certain defined patterns, according to
whether the claim of statehood has been made to obtain full member-
ship in the United Nations or some lesser benefits. This in no way
denies the validity of the legal criteria of statehood; on the contrary,
it insists that the political organs of the United Nations have chosen to
adhere to them, and that recognition of this fact has been blurred
through fallacious assumptions as to the true significance of interpre-
tations which are variable rather than absolute. To interpret guiding
symbols in the light of differing claims affecting community interests
is not to deny the sanctity of law but to confirm it in its most effica-
cious sense.
In the discussion to follow, it will be attempted, by examination
of United Nations practice, to establish the general hypothesis sug-
gested above. In addition, there will be recommended certain con-
siderations to be taken into account in the future, when the political
organs will again be called upon-in ever-changing world conditions-
to interpret juridical criteria in the context of differing claims, for the
furtherance of community interests.
Under traditional international law it has been commonly as-
sumed that four criteria must be met before an entity can be said to
be a "state." In the words of the Montevideo Convention on the
Rights and Duties of States, "the state as a person of international law
should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent popula-
tion; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter
into relations with the other states." 2 Attempts at more detailed and
sophisticated definitions have proved abortive.3
The Charter of the United Nations itself mentions the term
"state" no fewer than thirty-one times.4 These provisions form at
least part of the framework for any claims of statehood that may be
made before that organization, since claims as to the existence of
statehood are not made in vacuo, but are tied to specific, related claims.
These, stemming from the initial and comprehensive claim of pos-
session of the attributes of statehood, include claims to be admitted
to the United Nations,5 to appear before specific organs of the United
2 Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881.
3 For example, India proposed that a definition of "state" be included in the Draft
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/2, at 170
(1948), but the International Law Commission "concluded that no useful purpose
would be served .... " by such a definition, International Law Comr'n, Report,
U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. RIc. [hereinafter cited as GAOR] 4th Sess., Supp. No. 10,
para. 49 (A/925) (1949).
4 1n art. 2, paras. 4-7; art. 3; art. 4, paras. 1-2; art. 11, para. 2; art. 32; art. 35,
para. 2; art. 43, para. 3; art. 50; art. 52, para. 3; art. 53, paras. 1-2; art. 59; art. 79;
art. 80, para. 1; art. 81; art. 93, para. 2; art. 107; and art. 110, paras. 1-4.
5 U.N. CAgRmz art. 4.
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Nations,6 to participate in certain specialized agencies, to bring mat-
ters affecting peace and security to the notice of the United Nations,7
to be a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice,' and
to achieve other benefits.'
In analyzing the treatment which claims of statehood have re-
ceived before the United Nations and related international organs,
this Article will stress the quality of the judgments which have con-
cerned membership in the United Nations itself, discussing briefly
the criteria of permanent population, defined territory, and stable and
effective government. Particularly careful consideration will be given
to the more ambiguous requirement of independence, the treatment of
which has been responsible for most of the allegedly "politically moti-
vated" decisions on admission to the United Nations. Claims to mem-
bership in specialized agencies or to be a party to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice will be discussed insofar as they may
illustrate the more basic claim of statehood and reasons will be sug-
gested why this claim must receive more flexible treatment vis-A-vis
these organizations than toward the United Nations itself. Certain
other claims will be similarly analyzed. Finally, an attempt will be
made to evaluate the information presented and to draw some con-
clusions as to the proper application of the juridical concept of state-
hood in United Nations practice.
CLAIM TO ADMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
An entity which considers itself a state under international law
may apply for membership in the United Nations. In view of the
facts that the United Nations is today of nearly universal member-
ship,'0 and that a member of the United Nations acquires automatic
membership in the General Assembly," gains opportunities for periodic
representation on the other organs ' (including the Security Council),
and automatically becomes a party to the Statute of the International
6 U.N. CHARTER art. 32.
7 U.N. CHARTER art. 35, para. 2.8 U.N. CHARTER art. 93, para. 2.
9 Thus the claim of statehood may arise in other contexts not immediately sug-
gested by the charter, e.g., the claim for recognition as a state by existing members
of the international community, the claim to protection of its nationals and control
over its resources, the claim to succession to certain rights and assets of a parent
state, and the claim that certain changes do not affect identity. In theory, each of
these claims could arise within the context of the effect of United Nations practice
upon international law. However, this Article only attempts to deal with those
areas where the issue has arisen both directly and sharply enough to warrant ex-
amination.
10 As of October 30, 1960, ninety-nine states were members of the United Nations.
Since that time, several newly emerged states have been proposed for membership,
but none has been admitted.
31 U.N. CHARTER art. 9.
12 U.N. CHARTER arts. 23, 61, 86.
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Court of Justice, 3 this may be characterized as a claim to comprehen-
sive participation.
A study of United Nations practice in relation to this claim will
reveal a surprisingly close adherence to the traditional legal criteria
of statehood. In those cases where deviations from the traditional
norms appear to have taken place, such deviations may easily be ex-
plained in terms of permissible interpretation under Article 4(1) or of
flexibility or uncertainty in the criteria themselves. 14
Claims for admission to comprehensive membership in the United
Nations should be divided into those for original membership in the
world organization and those for subsequent membership.
Claim to Original Membership
This claim deserves only brief attention, since it does not fall
within the field of United Nations "practice" but represents a sui
generis case arising from pre-1946 circumstances and agreements.
The Charter of the United Nations divides members into two
classes--original members and elected members. Article 3 states that
"The original Members of the United Nations shall be the States
which, having participated in the United Nations Conference on Inter-
national Organization at San Francisco, or having previously signed
the Declaration by United Nations of 1 January 1942, sign the
present Charter and ratify it in accordance with Article 110."
The appearance of Byelorussia and the Ukraine at the San Fran-
cisco Conference was the outcome of a compromise on a point that had
been in issue since before the Dumbarton Oaks discussions. 5 The
United States, supported by Great Britain, had urged at Dumbarton
Oaks the inclusion of "associated states," which were classified as those
which had been invited to the United Nations economic conferences
and which were assisting the belligerents though not technically at
war. 6 The Soviet Union, as the price for this, requested the inclusion
as original members of all sixteen of the newly autonomous Soviet
13 U.N. CHiARrF art. 93, para. 1.
14 Cf. Robinson, Metamorphosis of the United Nations, 94 RECEUU. DES CouRs
497, 550-51 (1958), where it is contended that the "package deal" arranging the
simultaneous admission of eighteen states ignored all criteria for eligibility save
possibly that of statehood, and that the handling of the transformation of Syria and
Egypt into the United Arab Republic did away with legal reference even to statehood.
As to the latter, see Cotran, Some Legal Aspects of the Formation of the United
Arab Republic and the United Arab States, 8 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 346 (1959).
15 See the earlier Soviet request for special representation of certain Soviet
Republics on the Allied War Crimes Commission, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, POSTwAR
FOREIGN PoLicy PREPARATION, 1939-1945, at 318 n.19 (1949). It was generally felt
that the autonomy decree of February 1944 tied in with this move. See RussE.L
& MUTHER, A HISTORY OF THE UNIT D NATIONS CHARTER 361 (1958).
16 Six Latin American states, Egypt, Iceland, and the Provisional French Gov-
ernment (which in actual fact joined as a signatory of the Declaration on January 1,
1945) were in this class. See RUSSELL & MUTHER, op. cit. supra note 15, at 508.
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Republics." Ultimately it was the vexed point of voting in the Secu-
rity Council which was used by the United States as the bargaining
lever." When, at Yalta, the U.S.S.R. acceded to the United States
voting proposals, it reaffirmed its desire for the admission of the
Soviet Republics, but stated that at the present time it would be satis-
fied with the admission of two or three republics. 9 The United States
and Great Britain agreed to this request, since, having obtained both
Russian consent on Security Council voting and a reduced demand
for Soviet membership, they felt that the extra votes in the Assembly
would not make much practical difference.
The position of India and the Philippines among the original
members was also anomalous. At no time was there any serious oppo-
sition to their inclusion. At the very early stages, when the United
States was engaged in formulating a draft constitution, it was sug-
gested that "all self-governing States and Dominions, accepting the
obligations of membership, shall be Members of the International
Organization." '20 The Staff Charter, which was drafted in the
summer of 1943, contained a provision on membership referring to
"independent states." 21 India and the Philippines were apparently
considered to be covered by this provision.22 At the San Francisco
Conference itself the Philippine delegate requested that the term
"nation" be used in the committee draft instead of "state." " The
17 The first formal request was not made public, for fear it would jeopardize
negotiations. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 317-18. President
Roosevelt later declared to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that he would
ask for membership of all forty-eight states if Stalin insisted on membership for all
sixteen republics. The status of the republics was defined by the Soviet Autonomy
Decree of February 1, 1944, which allowed the republics "to enter into direct relation
with foreign States." See also Aufricht, Principles and Practices of Recognition by
Internatiomd Organizations, 43 Am. J. INT'L L. 679, 695-98 (1949).
18The main conflict in this area had centered about defining the cases to which
the veto should apply and deciding whether a permanent member party to a dispute
should have the right to vote. Yalta Conference, Third Plenary Meeting, Bohlen
Minutes, [1945] FoREIGN RrL. U.S. 661-63 (1955).
19Those suggested were White Russia, the Ukraine, and Lithuania. Yalta
Conference, Fourth Plenary Meeting, Bohlen Minutes, id. at 712. The last was
eventually dropped by agreement. See Memorandum of Decisions Reached at the
Crimean Conference in the Matter of the Two Soviet Republics, id. at 991-92;
RUSSELL & MUTHER, op. cit. supra note 15, at 536-37.
20 RuSSELl. & MUTHER, op. cit. supra note 15, at 350. In the Draft Constitution
"qualified" was substituted for "self-governing." See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, op. cit.
supra note 15, at 473.
2 1 Id. at 526.
22 India did not become a self-governing dominion within the British Common-
wealth until August 15, 1947. However, at the time of the San Francisco Conference
its acquisition of statehood as a self-governing dominion had been conceded and only
awaited implementation by formal parliamentary action. President Truman pro-
claimed the independence of the Philippine Commonwealth on July 4, 1946.
23 Doc. No.. 242, 1/2/11, 7 U.N. CONF. INT'L ORG. Docs. 24 (1945). This request
was met in Committee 1/2 by providing that "all nations participating in this Con-
ference should be regarded as initial members of the Organization." Doc. No. 606,
1/2/43, id. at 121; Doc. No. 1074, 1/2/76, id. at 288.
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Coordination Committee, feeling that uniformity of expression was
of paramount importance, finally decided that all participants in the
Conference should be considered "states." And in the Charter text
itself the word "nation" was dropped in favor of "state." '
India had long been a participant in world affairs. She held a
position of importance in the British Commonwealth, had an exem-
plary war record, and had played an active role in the League; the
part played by the Philippines in the war was equally relevant. To
have denied them original membership would have been both unde-
sirable and embarrassing.
2 5
It may be seen, therefore, that with regard to the claim of original
membership, decisions were taken for the admission of territorial
communities whose accurate description at that time fell short of
meeting traditional legal criteria. There never was any pretense of
adherence, and to treat this as a sui generis case not truly indicative
of United Nations practice-where at least there is a formal effort
at adherence to the criteria-would seem to be a more realistic ap-
praisal than to suggest that "the word 'state' is not to be understood
in its usual legal sense." 26
Claim to Subsequent Membership
In analyzing the treatment received by the large number of claim-
ants in this classification, it is more instructive to consider United
Nations practice in terms of each of the traditional legal criteria of
statehood than to examine the treatment given the applications of
each claimant.
Permanent Population
No claims in the practice of the United Nations have raised
questions concerning this criterion. It might be suggested that the
2 4 Though "nation" was retained for more general reference, such as in the
Preamble and Article 1. See RUSSELL & MUTHER, op. cit. supra note 15, at 928 n.60.
25 For India's status in the early years of the United Nations, see Liang, Ad-
mission of the Indian States to the United Natims, 43 Am. J. INT'L L. 134, 144-54
(1949). Lebanon and Syria likewise participated in the Conference, although the
French Government at that time took the view that its responsibilities were not yet
terminated in Lebanon and Syria.
2 6 GoODIcH & HAMBRo, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 124 (1949).
See also K.ELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 59-60 (1950). It is significant
that article 1, paragraph 2, of the Covenant of the League of Nations had used the term
"any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony." The refusal to follow this prece-
dent and the misuse of the word "state" to cover entities lacking state character is
possibly to be explained by the traditional dualist theory that only states may be subjects
of international law. In actual fact no colony ever applied for membership in the League
of Nations. As is pointed out by Rudzinski, Admission of New Members, 1952 INT'L
CoNC. 143, 145, the questionnaire used by the League in the normal admission pro-
cedure of investigation spoke of "a nation" and asked whether it was fully self-
governing. In practice this meant at least a dominion, such as Ireland in 1923.
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existence of a permanent population would be relevant if Antarctica
were to claim statehood.
Defined Territory
Much of the controversy which surrounded the application of
the newly proclaimed state of Israel for membership in the United
Nations stemmed from doubts as to whether it met the requirement
of a defined territory. The Arab states, led by Syria, contended that
since Israel's borders were contested, its statehood must be denied."
The United Kingdom also offered this as the reason for its refusal
either to recognize the state of Israel or to support its application for
admission."8 Other representatives, construing the territorial require-
ment more liberally, thought that the General Assembly resolution of
19472 9 conferred territory upon Israel and that it did not matter that
certain details as to the delimitation of this territory remained unset-
tled.8" When, after postponement of the issue, consideration of the ap-
plication was taken up again, Israel's request for membership was
granted.31
In other cases the requirement of a "defined territory" has tended
to be blurred by the existence of territorial disputes and other fac-
tors; 2 and in yet other cases it has been used as something of an
automatic argument in the cold war.33  Nevertheless, the only unam-
27U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. [hereinafter cited as SCOR] 3d year,
385th meeting 3-4 (S/1121) (1948); SCOR 3d year, 386th meeting 19-20 (S/PV.
386) (1948). See also statements by Egypt, GAOR 3d Sess. pt. 2, Plenary 311-12
(A/855) (1949); GAOR 3d Sess. pt. 2, Ad Hoc Pol. Comm. 267 (A/818) (1949);
by Iraq, id. at 181, 289; by Lebanon, id. at 107, 220, 222; by Saudi Arabia, id. at
294-95; by Yemen, id. at 305-06; and by Pakistan, id. at 321.
28 SCOR 3d year, 383d meeting 15-16 (S/1093) (1948).
29 GAOR 2d Sess., Resolutions, No. 181(11), at 131 '(1947).
3oE.g., Uraguay, GAOR 3d Sess., Ad Hoc Pol. Comm. 297 (A/18) (1949);
U.S.S.R., SCOR 3d year, 383d meeting 22 (S/1093) (1948); SCOR 3d year, 386th
meeting 30-31 (S/1121) (1948). See especially the speech by Representative Jessup
of the United States, SCOR 3d year, 383d meeting 9 (S/1093) (1948), noting that
both "reason and history" demand no precise delimitations of the boundaries of a
territory.
31 SCOR 4th year, 414th meeting 14 (S/1267) (1949). A fair assessment of
the legal dispute in this case requires some reference to the political pressures of the
Jews in America and the Arab states on England and France. Nor was the Soviet
Union unaffected by the Israeli-Arab disputes.
32 Thus France couched its objections to the admission of Siam, with which it
had a territorial dispute, in terms of the continuation of a state of war between the
two countries caused by Siam's aggression in Indo-China. In actual fact, Siam's
agreement to participate in a projected conciliation commission was the shne qua non
of French support for her application, and this support was ultimately obtained.
SCOR 1st year, 2d ser., 83d meeting 562, Supp. No. 4, at 43-47 (S/23), (S/14),
(S/21) (1946).
33 Thus Greece's objection to the admission of Albania, whose application came
in the coldest era of the cold war, was that a disputed claim between them to
northern Epirus was still outstanding. SCOR 1st year, 2d ser., Supp. No. 4, at
20-24 (S/123) (1946). The issue of defined territory constantly arose with regard
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biguous case which could be cited in support of the contention that
power politics has caused the United Nations to ignore this traditional
legal requirement is that of Israel.34  However, an examination of
past practice will at once reveal that this criterion has never been
interpreted very strictly. For example, Albania was admitted to
membership in the League of Nations even though her frontiers had
not yet been delimited."5 It would therefore seem that this traditional
criterion of statehood has been treated as of importance in United
Nations practice, and that, given its traditional liberal interpretation,
it has always been properly applied.
Stable and Effective Government
The third of the traditional legal criteria of statehood has given
rise to considerable and varied controversy. While the question of the
existence of stable and effective government has inevitably become
linked to some extent to the question of recognition of governments,
we are here concerned not with recognition per se, but with recogni-
tion as it throws light upon the existence of a state.
The continuing relevance of this criterion may be seen in the
applications for membership of the Republic of Korea and the Demo-
cratic Republic of Korea. The United States and China have con-
sistently maintained that the government of South Korea is the only
lawful government, being elected by the people and exercising effective
to the applications of the divided states of North and South Korea and North and
South Vietnam. The Afghanistan representative refused to vote for the admission
of Pakistan because his government did not recognize the northwest frontier as a
part of Pakistan. GAOR 2d Sess., Plenary 313-14 (A/C.1/188) (1947).
34By the time Israel's application came up for final consideration-in March
1949-all the members of the Security Council, with the exception of Egypt, had
recognized Israel, as had more than two-thirds of the nations in the General Assembly.
Yet Israel's boundaries remained undefined. It may also, be mentioned that the
boundaries of Yemen-both at the time of her admission and to the present date-
are far from clear. And the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) was admitted to
membership at the 15th session of the Assembly, although a part of the area which
was claimed by the Congo was declared by M. Tshombe to have seceded and to
comprise the separate state of Katanga.
3 5 LEAGUE oF NATIONS OFF. J. 1st Ass. 651 (1920). This problem was ex-
amined by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Monastery at St.
Naoum Case, P.C.IJ., ser. B, No. 9, at 9-10 (1924), which found nothing amiss in the
fact that the Great Powers had recognized Albania as a sovereign and independent
state in spite of the fact that the complete fixing of its frontiers had been prevented
by World War I. See also Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschaft v. Polish State,
[1929-30] Ann. Dig. 11 (No. 5) (1929). The tribunal said: "In order to say that a
state exists . . . it is enough that [its] . . . territory has a sufficient consistency
even though its borders have not yet been accurately delimited . . . ." Id. at 15.
It is pointed out in LAUTERPAcHT, RECOGNIMON IN INTE NATIONAL LAW 30 (1947),
that most of the new states which arose after World War I were recognized de facto
or de jure before their frontiers were finally laid down in treaties. However, when
the doubts as to the future frontiers were of a serious nature, statehood became in
doubt. Thus, when in 1919 Estonia and Latvia were recognized by the Allied Powers,
no recognition was granted to Lithuania on the express ground that owing to the
Vilna dispute, her frontiers were not yet fixed.
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control over that part of Korea which the United Nations Commission
was able to observe and in which the great majority of the Korean
people live. 6 Certainly this government was acknowledged by the
General Assembly as the only government in Korea by its resolution
of December 12, 1 9 4 8 .37 The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has
argued that the South Korean Government is a puppet government,
created by illegal action of the United Nations.38  Two points become
apparent: first, that by and large there has been a tendency among
members to interpret this legal criterion to mean democratic, rather
than purely effective, government; and second, that the requirement
of the existence of a government as a prerequisite to statehood at times
comes very near, and in part overlaps, the requirement of independence,
which will be discussed below. Thus, as to the applications for mem-
bership of the Republic of Vietnam and of the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam, the representative of France contended that "the so-called
Democratic Republic of Vietnam has none of the attributes which
confer international status on a State . . . [and] represents nothing
but a political faction." " Similarly, when the application of Israel
was under discussion, the Syrian representative questioned not only
the legal, but also the moral, existence of that country's provisional
government: "What is the Provisional Government of Israel? Who
elected it? Does it rest upon the people? There have been no elections
so far. The Government has nothing to substantiate it. It cannot
be recognized as a democratic Government. . . . We cannot consider
such a Government as a Government with adequate right to claim ad-
mission to membership in the United Nations." 0
The fairly distinct pattern of consistent adherence to the require-
ment of a stable and effective government in United Nations practice
38 SCOR 4th year, 409th meeting 14-15 (S/1238) (1949) ; SCOR 4th year, 410th
meeting 10 (S/1238) (1949); SCOR 4th year, 423d meeting 2 (S/1238) (1949).
S7 See GAOR 3d Sess., 187th meeting Resolutions No. 195(111) (A/788) (1948).
38 SCOR 4th year, 410th meeting 8, 9, 15 (S/PV.410) (1949) ; SCOR 7th year,
599th meeting 25 (S/PV.599) (1952); GAOR 7th Sess., Ad Hoc Pol. Comm.
272 (A/2208) (1952).
39 SCOR 7th year, 603d meeting 12 (S/2773) (1952). Compare the reply of
the Russian delegate that "the Democratic Republic of Vietnam exists . . . its
army, parliament and government exist and, which is most important and funda-
mental . . .its people exist." Id. at 15. "Is it not convincing argument in proof
of the existence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam that French ruling circles
have now been waging an obdurate struggle for over five years against that Republic
. ?" Id. at 14-15.
40 SCOR 3d year, 385th meeting 4-5 (S/PV.385) (1948). Compare the com-
ment of the United States representative that the government of Israel was a func-
tioning political entity with firmly established governmental institutions exercising
effective internal administration. SCOR 3d year, 383d meeting 12 (S/1093) (1948).
Other examples may be found, such as the observation of the Australian delegate
upon the application of Ceylon that that country had "a democratic government
which exercises full authority over the territory and population." GAOR 3d Sess.,
pt. 1, Ad Hoc Pol. Comm. 132 (A/617) (1948).
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has been blurred by the recent admission of the Republic of the Congo
(Leopoldville) to the world organization. 41  The recommendation of
the Security Council that the Congo be admitted to membership oc-
curred at a time when there was no doubt as to the existence of a legal
and effective government.4" When, on September 19, 1960, the Gen-
eral Assembly voted to admit the Congo to the United Nations,43
political considerations made it impossible for either the East or the
West to oppose the action, although the fact that the Assembly was
unable or unwilling to choose among the warring Congolese factions
to seat a representative of the new nation suggests that there were
considerable grounds to doubt the existence of a government that was
either stable or effective at this crucial date. Certainly subsequent
events, while not controlling as to the validity of the original action,
confirm these earlier grounds for doubt.
Some mention of the position of China should be made at this
point. That nation was admitted as a signatory member of the United
Nations at a time when there was no doubt that it had an effective gov-
ernment. However, since 1949 there has been open dissension as to
whether the effective government of China is still the Nationalist gov-
ernment or is that of Mao Tse-tung, whether there are now two states
of China, and whether a change should be made in the representation
of China in the United Nations.44 I would suggest that the issue is
properly one of representation, and that the all too frequently made
contention that the case of China in the United Nations represents a
departure from the legal requirement of an effective government is
fallacious. It is perhaps worth emphasizing that the necessity of
statehood, mentioned in Article 4, is, like the requirement that an
applicant be "peace-loving," relevant to the claim of admission, and
not to continued participation. Thus Article 6, which deals with
expulsion from the Organization, does not give as a ground a lapse in
effective government or a change in effective government. Such
issues are more properly dealt with in terms of changes in the repre-
sentatives of states already admitted.4"
41 See GAOR 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 64 (A/4684) (1960).
42U.N. Doc. No. S/4377 (1960).
43GAOR 4th Emer. Spec. Sess., 863d meeting, Plenary 102 (A/L.292/r.1)
(1960).
44 See, e.g., LAUTERPACHT, BORCHARD, WRIGHT & MORRISON, LEGAL ASPECTS IN
THE FAR EASTERN PROBLEM 115 (1941); Wright, The Chinese Recognition; Problem,
49 Am. J. INT'L L. 320, 329 (1955).
45 It is of interest that since the Hungarian uprising of 1956 the credentials of
the Hungarian representatives at the United Nations have not been approved by the
credentials committee. However, the representatives have been admitted to full
participation in the work of the organization, in spite of this gesture. Unlike the
case of China, there was-save for a brief spell-no rival government in Hungary
claiming to be the effective government of that state.
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In summary, it may be said that, apart from the aberration in the
case of the Congo, the long-established criterion of effective govern-
ment as a prerequisite to statehood has been fully conceded and ad-
hered to in United Nations practice; and that there has been a tendency
on the part of both East and West to give at least lip service to the
idea that such government should be the seat not only of effective,
but also of formal, authority, in that it should be selected by the free
choice of the people concerned. The issue of how much of the terri-
tory must be controlled by a government for it to be effective remains
incapable of precise answer; but the suggestion that an attitude of
caution be maintained towards a government engaged in civil war
with a rival national government seems sound.4
Independence
Traditional international law has long demanded that before an
entity can be acknowledged as a state, it must possess independence
and sovereignty. The problem of the degree of compliance necessary
is manifestly even more acute in relation to this criterion than in rela-
tion to those of fixed frontiers and stable government. A wealth of
material arising from the practice of the United Nations is available
and reveals much disagreement in the organization itself both as to
what constitute the legal requirements of independence and as to
when in fact these requirements have been met.
It is difficult to gauge the degree to which the political organs of
the United Nations have followed this criterion, since not only are
the many cases on this point open to varying interpretations, but the
traditional law on the subject is itself less precise than one might
hope. The writings of jurists reveal disagreement centered on two
main questions: Can a dependent entity be a state in international
law? At what point do restrictions upon sovereignty cause a loss of
independence? These questions are most meaningfully discussed in
the context of the claims in which they were raised, and here we are
concerned with claims for comprehensive participation in the United
Nations.
It would seem that the concept of independence is an indispensable
element in the notion of statehood under international law when the
term "state" is used for a claim to comprehensive participation.1
7
46 See Rudzinski, supra note 26, at 173, where it is suggested that from this
point of view the early endorsement by the General Assembly of the application for
membership of the Republic of Korea (though it proved abortive in the circumstances)
in Resolution 296 (IV) was rather premature.47 "International law governs relations between independent States." Case of the
S.S. "Lotus," P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 18 (1927). Its aim is "to regulate the relations
between those co-existing independent communities." Ibid. Cf. id. at 34 (Loder, J.,
dissenting): "The family of nations consists of a collection of different sovereign
and independent States."
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The Report of the International Committee of Jurists investigating
the Aaland Islands Case in 1920 48 is instructive. After recalling the
conditions of revolution and disorder which had prevailed in Finland
at the time, it stated:
It is therefore difficult to say at what exact date the Finnish Re-
public in the legal sense of the term actually became a definitely
constituted sovereign state. This certainly did not take place
until a stable political organization had been created, and until
the public authorities had become strong enough to assert them-
selves throughout the territories of the state without the assistance
of foreign troops.49
A similar emphasis on the notion of independence is to be found
in the Customs Union case,50 which contains the celebrated definition
of independence by Judge Anzilotti: "[Independence] . . . may also
be described as sovereignty (suprema potestas) , or external sovereignty,
by which is meant that the State has over it no other authority than
that of international law. The conception of independence, regarded
as the normal characteristic of States as subjects of international law,
cannot be better defined than by comparing it with the [class of] . . .
'dependent states.'" i This definition requires the presence of two
elements: the "separateness of the state and its direct subordination to
international law.
52
Thus stated, a problem immediately poses itself: In deciding
whether an entity is indeed independent, does one look merely to the
formal arrangements relevant to its independence, or does one "look
behind" the formal arrangements to the effective facts? In other
words, is "actual independence" as much a condition of statehood as
"legal independence"? I would say that it is on the assumption that
any appraisal of criteria which is to be of legal significance must go
beyond mere form to substance.53  There are obviously great difficul-
ties involved in implementing this choice--particularly in obtaining
and handling material to determine "actual" independence. However,
if a legal evaluation of actual independence proves impossible, then
48 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., Spec. Supp. No. 3, at 3 (1920).
4DId. at 9.
50 Customs Rigime Between Germany and Austria, P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 41
(1931).
51 Id. at 57.
5 2 A comprehensive and most useful discussion of this twofold approach to the
concept of independence is to be found in MAREK, IDENTITY AND CONTINUITr OF
STATES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 166-80 (1954).
53Authority for the view that actual independence is relevant may be found
in LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 46-51 (1947). See also
1 SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 58 (2d ed. 1949), where it is asserted that
at a certain point it becomes sheer formalism to argue that a restriction on the exercise
of sovereign rights accepted by a treaty cannot be considered as an infringement of
sovereignty.
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political motivations must be channelled into useful and desirable
paths to help assess the situation.54
It is apparent that absolute independence is impossible in present
day society, that states are becoming increasingly interdependent in
spheres which at one time would have been regarded as solely within
the internal domainY The question of the extent to which inde-
pendence or sovereignty " may be delegated or ceded to another
entity without resultant loss of statehood has never had a simple
answer. One can only ask: At what stage has a state consented to
such limitations of its independence that it is "shorn of the last vestige
of power" and that "a ghost of a hollow sovereignty cannot be per-
mitted to obscure the realities of this situation"? 5' It would seem
that the sovereignty of a state goes so far as to authorize it to resign
sovereignty and thus "commit suicide" under international law,5" as
when a state enters into a federation and loses its international per-
sonality. To discover whether it was "suicide" or "murder," 'I it is
necessary to look behind formalism to the facts.
An examination of United Nations practice with regard to the
traditional requirement of independence may best be carried out in
regard to certain legal arguments which have arisen concerning that
concept.
Mode of Establishment and Maintenance
Both the Eastern and Western blocs in the United Nations have
consistently recognized the relevance of actual and not mere legal
independence, although they have differed in their interpretation of
the facts in given cases. Both the definitions of independence cited
above and the emphasis in the Charter upon the rights of peoples
54 Some suggestions of the values which should be sought in any such ultimate
political solution are made at the end of this Article.
55 See, e.g., Jessup, The Equality of States as Dogma and Reality, 60 POL. SCL Q.
527 (1945). On forms of contemporary economic dependence, see generally -AWTREY,
ECONomic ASPECTS OF SOVEREIGNTY (2d ed. 1952).
56 It should be stated that in this Article these terms are being used interchange-
ably, although the author is well aware that it has been suggested that the two terms
represent distinct sets of facts. Van Kleffens, Sovereignty in International Law, 82
REcE UL DES COURS 89 (1953), contends that the term "independence" presupposes the
presence of at least two states, whereas "sovereignty" is not so conditioned, thus
making the latter an absolute term, the former a relative one. Compare dictum in
the Island of Palmas Case (The Netherlands v. United States), 2 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb.
Awards 829, 838 (1928), that "sovereignty in the relations between States signifies
independence." In Customs REgime Between Germany and Austria, P.C.I.J., ser.
A/B, No. 41 (1931), the Permanent Court appeared to treat as synonymous the char-
acteristics of sovereignty and independence.
57Lighthouses in Crete and Samoa Case, P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 71, at 127
(1937) (Hudson, J.).
's See ST. KORoWICZ, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 67 (1959).
59 It is suggested, for example, that the ostensible self-annihilation of Lithuania,
Estonia, and Latvia, in 1940 was in fact provoked by pressure from without.
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to self-determination make it clear that independence, though formally
present, may actually be lacking if the so-called state is created or
maintained by an external power against the will of its people. Such
cases go beyond the line of that necessary dependence on other states
which is part of the complexity of international relations.60
In spite of repeated affirmations of these principles by both East
and West, certain states have been admitted to the United Nations
whose true independence may be questioned. However, this does not
indicate the rejection of actual independence as a valid criterion of
statehood; rather, it illustrates the difficulty of ascertaining the facts
needed to make the required judgment.6 1
The case law of the United Nations abounds in examples of con-
troversies under this head. The application of the Republic of Korea
for membership met with the opposition of the Communist states, the
U.S.S.R. claiming that it was in reality nothing more than a puppet
state imposed upon the Korean people by foreign occupation authori-
ties with the assistance of members of the United Nations Temporary
Commission on Korea. 2 Similarly, when the application of South
Vietnam was discussed, the Soviet delegate stated that "that colonial
state . . . was only being maintained at the sacrifice of the people of
Vietnam by the Franco-American aggressors." 63 With respect to
Laos and Cambodia, the Soviet representative held that the mere
fact that an official statement by a French Minister was needed for
the submission of their applications to the United Nations revealed
that they were puppet states.64
6 0 Thus Judge Anzilotti in the Customs Regime Between Austria and Germany,
P.C.I.J. ser. A/B, No. 41, at 58, commented "that the legal conception of inde-
pendence has nothing to do . . . with the numerous and constantly increasing states
of de facto dependence which characterize the relation of one country to other coun-
tries."6 1 Past practice has shown the necessity of this criterion of statehood-as in the
cases of the "puppet states" of Slovakia, Croatia, and Manchukuo. Thus, following her
attack on China in 1931, Japan refrained from a straightforward annexation of
Manchuria, instead setting up a state which served all the purposes of annexation in
everything but name. The formal aspects of Manchukuo's alleged statehood were
carefully preserved, causing such distinguished jurists as Professor Cavar6 to assert
the statehood of Manchukuo. See Cavar6, La Reconmissance de ltat et le Mand-
choukono, 42 REVUE GtN-RALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PuBLic 5, 32 (1935). How-
ever, the Report of the League of Nations Commission gives little support to this
attitude; rather, it upholds the viewpoint that formal criteria are not enough-that
an examination of the facts is still necessary. See REPORT OF COM'N OF ENQunY
97 (League of Nations Publ. No. 1932.VII.A.12). See also the resolution adopted
by the League Assembly on February 24, 1933, LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., Spec.
Supp. 112, at 75-76 (1933). For a most useful commentary on the problem of puppet
states, see generally MAREKc, op. cit. supra note 52, at 112-20.
62 SCOR 4th year, 423d meeting 7 (5/1281) (1949).
63 SCOR 7th year, 603d meeting 4-9 (S/PV.603) (1952).
6 4 Id. at 2. It should be added that during consideration of these applications by
the Ad Hoc Political Committee, the representatives of Burma, India, Indonesia, and
the Philippines all abstained from the draft declarations in favor of admission, be-
cause they were doubtful of the status of the applicants. GAOR 7th Sess., Ad Hoc
Pol. Comm. 318 (A/AC.61/L.38), (A/AC.61/L.39), (A/AC.61/L.40) (1952).
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The relevance of the mode of establishment of a state to the
criterion of independence is well illustrated by Mongolia's application
for admission. The application has been before the United Nations
since its second session, and efforts by the Soviet Union to secure its
acceptance were only temporarily suspended in the last few years.
The U.S.S.R. claimed that the Mongolians had attained their inde-
pendence by democratic means, having voted for independence in
1945, and that this plebiscite had been recognized by Mongolia's two
immediate neighbors, China and the Soviet Union. 5 Nevertheless,
the majority of the members of the Committee on Admissions thought
that the information available was not enough to show that Mongolia
was in fact an independent state.66 However, by the tenth session
of the Security Council, in 1955, it began to look as if an arrangement
would be made for the approval of most of the applications which had
been pending for the past six years. The Cold War was thawing and
a compromise formula for the admission of states backed by East and
West-with the exception of the divided states-had been reached.
7
The United States stopped pressing the point that Mongolia lacked
the requisite independence," and for a while it looked as if the appli-
cation of Mongolia might go through successfully together with the
other seventeen. However, subsequent to China's recognition of
Mongolia, border disputes had arisen between the two nations, chang-
ing China's initial support into opposition. 9 Furthermore, in a sixty-
member General Assembly, the United States had clear power to
prevent the ouster of Nationalist China, whereas the admission of
eighteen new members would possibly change the balance on this
issue. Therefore, Nationalist China, claiming that the so-called
"package deal" was unconstitutional and that Mongolia failed to
fulfill the requirements of Article 4, vetoed the application, with the
consequence that the Soviet Union vetoed the application of Japan.7"
65 SCOR 1st year, 2d ser., Supp. No. 4, at 65 (S/95) (1946).
66 See SCOR 2d year, Spec. Supp. No. 3, at 13 (S/95) (1947). See generally
CONDITIONS TO ADmiSSION OF A STATE TO MEMBERSHIP iN THE UNITED NATIONS
CASE--PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, AND DOCUMENTS 42 (I.C.J. 1948) (Dr. Kerno),
which contains a useful summary of the fortunes of this and other applications.
6 7 The history of this period has been amply recorded elsewhere. See, e.g.,
Gross, Progress Towards Universality of Membership in the United Nationts, 50 Am.
J. INT'L L. 791 (1956) ; Robinson, Metamorphosis of the United Nations, 99 REcEuri.
DES COORS 497, 503-13 (1958); Rudzinski, Admission of New Members, 1952 INT'L
CoNc. 143.
68 See SCOR 10th year, 701st meeting 18 (S/PV.701) (1955).
69 In 1947 Mongolian troops invaded China to a depth of 100 kilometers. This
matter was raised by the Chinese representative as evidence that Mongolia was not
"peace-loving." SCOR 10th year, 703d meeting 11 (S/PV.703) (1955).
70 SCOR 10th year, 704th meeting 11, 14 (S/PV.704) (1955). See also SCOR
10th year, 706th meeting 1-22 (S/PV.706/r.1) (1955).
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The political overtones in the case of Mongolia are so strong that
little or no conclusive evidence can be obtained on the relevance of
the issue of independence as evidenced by the mode of establishment
and maintenance of the state. It is of significance that prior to the
plebiscite in 1945, the Soviet Union had acknowledged China's
sovereignty over Outer Mongolia; the recognition by China of the
full sovereignty of the Mongolian People's Republic subsequent to the
plebiscite supplied at least prima facie evidence of the independent status
of that country.7 The evidence examined by the Security Council
Committee on Admissions revealed an independence that would appear
to have been at least as great as that of several nations which were
acknowledged members of the United Nations. 2 From any point of
view, the case study of Mongolia can only be termed unsatisfactory;
if it is used as proof that one looks only to formal independence and
not to actual independence, then it is difficult to see why the application
was rejected, and even more difficult to understand the great amount
of time and effort expended on assessing facts as to actual independence.
If one looks to actual independence, there would still appear to have
been sufficient grounds for the admission of Mongolia. The best
conclusion that can be reached is that the political pressure being
exercised at the time caused a deviation from legal norms on the
issue of statehood, despite the availability of a better political alterna-
tive provided by the fact that Article 4(1) allows a negative vote to
be cast on the grounds that the applicant is not "peace-loving."
An interesting case in which the actual independence of an appli-
cant was challenged on the grounds of an irregular mode of establish-
ment was that of Transjordan. The Polish delegation doubted the
sovereign independence of that nation, noting that Transjordan had
been a mandate and that the only way of bringing a mandate to a close
was by conformity with conditions which the League of Nations laid
down." The Polish Representative was of opinion that, in view
of the demise of the League, Article 77 of the Charter " now applied,
71 See FRITERs, OUTER MONGOLIA AND ITS INTERNATIONAL POSITION 286-87 (1949).
China, tom by her own civil wars, had ceased to be able to exercise any effective
pressure on Mongolia, and a face-saving formula was found by an exchange of notes
on August 14, 1945, in which the Chinese Government agreed to recognize the inde-
pendence of Outer Mongolia within its existing boundaries if a plebiscite confirmed
the desire for this.
72 See SCOR 1st year, 2d ser., Supp. No. 4, at 64-67 (S/95) (1946); SCOR
2d year, Spec. Supp. No. 3, at 8-13 (S/95) (1947).
73 SCOR 1st year, 2d ser., Supp. No. 4, at 70-71 (S/133) (1946) ; id. apps. 15,
17, at 133-37, 140-43. See generally CONDITIONS OF ADmisSIoN OF A STATE TO MEI-
BERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS CASE-PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND Docu-
MENTS 50 (I.C.J. 1948) (Dr. Kerno).74 Art. 77, para. 1: "The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in
the following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agree-
ments: (a) Territories now held under mandate . .. ."
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and that the formal agreement of the General Assembly was required to
end the mandate. A resolution did exist stating that the Assembly
"welcomes" the intention of the United Kingdom to establish
Transjordanian independence,75 but the Polish representative con-
tended that this was still a long way from recognizing a mandate as
a sovereign state. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, insisted
that Article 77 was not mandatory, 76 that as it had been made
clear before the General Assembly that Transjordan was to become
a sovereign independent state, no question of placing it under trustee-
ship arose, and that the General Assembly resolution clearly endorsed
the decision not to place it under trusteeship. In the outcome, the
arguments of the United Kingdom prevailed, and Jordan was admitted
along with sixteen other nations, by unanimous recommendation of
the Security Council, in December 1955-yet another instance of the
thaw in the cold war causing the dropping of previously used legal
arguments. However, the fact remains that an objective assessment
would have revealed an adequate independence of the applicant, and
runs counter to any argument that the so-called "package deal" allowed
the admission of entities which were not truly states.
Defense Arrangements with Former Colonial Powers
This head is obviously closely related to the preceding one. It
has been suggested on various occasions when formal independence
has been granted that actual independence does not exist due to military
arrangements which have been made with the former colonial power
which give it an effective control so great that the independence of the
new "state" is in name only. The applications for membership of both
Ceylon and Transjordan met with this argument. The treaty con-
cluded in London on March 22, 1946, between the United Kingdom
and Transjordan,77 arranging for the independence of the latter, con-
tained stipulations allowing the stationing of British armed forces in
Transjordan, storage of supplies and ammunition, facilities for the
training of armed forces, financial assistance to cover the cost of the
Transjordan army and the supervision of such funds. Both the
75 GAOR 1st Sess., pt. 1, Resolutions Adopted Jan. 10-Feb. 14, 1946, No. 11,
at 13 (1946).
76 SCOR 1st year, 2d ser., Supp. No. 4, App. 16, at 137-40 (S/133) (1946).
The problem of whether Article 77 is mandatory has been fully discussed elsewhere.
See generally Hall, Trusteeship System, 24 BRIT. Y. INT'L L. 164 (1947) ; Parry,
The Legal Nature of the Trusteeship Agreements, 27 BRIT. YB. INT'IL L. 164 (1950) ;
Sayre, Legal Problems Arising From the United Nations Trusteeship System, 42
Am. J. INT'L L. 263 (1948). The opinion of the International Court of Justice in
the International Status of South-West Africa Case, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 128, is also
instructive.
77 6 U.N.T.S. 143.
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U.S.S.R. and Poland claimed that these arrangements impaired the
real independence of Transjordan. 8 Similar objections with regard
to Ceylon 7 9 were probably less justified; the unique position of inde-
pendent states remaining within the British Commonwealth of Nations
does much to explain mutual defense arrangements made between
Ceylon and the United Kingdom when Ceylon became independent."0
In neither case did the objections prevent the ultimate admission of
the applicant.
The status of the newly independent countries would bear examina-
tion in the light of these considerations. Sixteen new states have been
admitted to membership in the United Nations since the beginning of
1960. Fifteen of these are in Africa.
Nigeria, formerly a British protectorate, has no major military
commitments to the United Kingdom."' Discussions which took place
between the government-elect of Nigeria and Her Majesty's Govern-
ment in Britain resulted in an understanding that a mutual defense
agreement would be signed "some time after independence." 82  No doubt
can exist as to Nigeria's fulfillment of the requirements of independence
under this head. Equal freedom from defense arrangements with the
former colonial power exists in the case of Somalia, 3 which to date
has incurred no such obligations.8
The position with regard to the former French colonies in Africa
is more complex. Both Togo and Cameroon have achieved complete
independence. Neither is a member of the French Community and
neither has signed a treaty of defense with France or is expected to do
so. The Malagasy Republic (formerly Madagascar), on the other
hand, is under treaty obligation to France 5 to provide mutual aid and
assistance in case of attack, and has placed the base of Di~go-Suarez at
the disposal of the armed forces of the French Community.88 The
Federation of Mali, comprising Sudan and Senegal, signed a treaty
78 SCOR 1st year, 2d ser., Supp. No. 4, at 136 (S/101) (1946); GAOR 2d
Sess., Plenary 1044-53 (A/471) (1947).
79 SCOR 3d year, 351st meeting 11-12 (S/820) (1948).
80 See, e.g., Bailey, Ceylon's New Status, 17 FAR EAsFTERN SURVEY 251-54 (1948);
Jennings, Dominion of Ceylon, 22 PACIFIC AFFAmS 21-33 (1949).
8 1 See Nigeria Independence Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 55.
826 COMMONWEALTH SURVEY 501 (1960). Such an agreement has now been
concluded. Cm. No. 1212 (1960).
83 Compromising the territories that were formerly British Somaliland and
Italian Somalia. The United Kingdom and Italy, respectively, held them as admin-
istering authorities under United Nations trusteeship.
84 Agreements and Exchanges of Letters between the Government of the United
Kingdom and Somalia, 1960. See also Somaliland Protectorate Constitutional Con-
ference, Report, CMD. NO. 1044 (1960).
85 Treaty of April 13, 1960, Bordereau Collectif No. 348/ct.
S6Id. art l(b): "Elle [France] aura la disposition de la base strat~gique de
Di~go-Suarez et d'installation militaires en en autres villes."
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with France on April 13, 1960.87 This likewise provided for mutual
aid and assistance, and ceded to France the bases of Cap-Vert (Dakar-
Thins), Saint-Louis, Kati, Bamako, Gar, and Tessalit.88 However,
Senegal withdrew from the federation and was recognized as a separate
independent state by France on September 11, 1960.89 On September
22, Sudan, renamed the Republic of Mali, also achieved separate state-
hood.90 Mali has withdrawn, at least temporarily, from the French
Community and has declared the accords with France to be null and
void." Senegal, remaining within the Community, apparently con-
tinues to regard itself as bound by the agreements with Paris, and
hence the cession of the base of Cap-Vert remains good. 2 The Ivory
Coast, Republic of the Upper Volta, Niger Republic, and Dohomey
Republic had signed no agreements with France at the date of their
admission to the United Nations, although such agreements are ex-
pected to be signed early in 1961." 3 As for Chad, Gabon, the Republic
of the Congo (Brazzaville), and the. Central African Republic, the
agreements which they signed as members of the French Community 4
provided neither for territorial reservations to France, nor for mutual
aid and assistance.
None of these states has committed itself to defense arrangements
which can truly give rise to doubts as to its independence. Treaties of
mutual defense and assistance are commonplace, and the granting of
bases to foreign troops is unexceptionable-especially within the frame-
work of a "community" which in many ways resembles that of the
British Commonwealth. Any other interpretation would be unjustified;
certainly it would be a sad position for international law to be caught
in if newly independent states had to prove their independence by total
and complete rupture from their former administrators.
87 Bordereau Collectif No. 348/ct.
88 Accord de Cooperation en Mati re de Defense, Bordereau Collectif No. 348/ct.
Annex 111. The French Army is to have free use, to military ends, of the facilities
("16ments constitutifs") of these bases. The distinction between the "ceding" of
these bases and "granting of disposition" over those of the Malagasy Republic is not
entirely clear.
89 By virtue of a communique from the office of Premier Debr6. Le Monde, Sept.
13, 1960, p. 7, cols. 1 & 2.
90 Le Monde, Sept. 23, 1960, p. 1, cols. 3 & 4.
91 This position has apparently been accepted by France. See note 92 infra.
92 It is uncertain at the present time whether new accords will be signed between
France and Senegal. I am grateful for this information and for that contained in
note 91 mipra to M. Guy de Crommines, Counsellor on African Affairs, of the French
Embassy in Washington. Further discussion as to the present status of this treaty
is more properly a question of state succession, and as such is beyond the scope of
this Article.
93 N.Y. Times, March 8, 1961, p. 3, col. 6.
94 Treaties of April 13, 1960, Bordereau Collectif No. 348/ct.
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The position with regard to Cyprus is more ambiguous. 5  Military
facilities reserved to the United Kingdom are both extensive and far-
reaching. The bases of Akrotiri and Dhekelia are reserved to British
sovereignty. 6 Further, other sites may be used "without restriction or
interference," 17 and extensive rights of control exist over Nicosia
airfield 9 and certain other military facilities.9 9  Unlike Senegal and
the Malagasy Republic, Cyprus has no benefit of restriction as to
the use to which the United Kingdom may put these bases. Certainly
this case would seem to come very close to the borderline of lack of true
independence, 100 yet no voice of protest was raised against the admission
of Cyprus.
Inadequate Size and Resources
The question is also asked, usually in relation to the "diminutive
state": At what point do limitations upon size or resources of a state
impair its true independence? It is noteworthy that no "diminutive
state" has ever applied for comprehensive membership in the United
Nations; hence there is no United Nations practice directly on point.10 1
Moreover, when discussing limitations on size and resources it be-
comes difficult to determine whether they more directly affect statehood
per se or ability to carry out the obligations of the Charter, as re-
quired of it by Article 4."°2 This is especially true if one regards
"statehood" and "independence" as normatively ambiguous terms
capable of precise definition only when tied to specific claims. How-
ever, ability and willingness by itself will not suffice for the admission
of an entity which is not truly independent; and both reasons have to
be offered for the nonappearance of such entities as San Marino,
Monaco, Andorra, and Liechtenstein upon the list of members.
0 3
9 5 See Draft Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, in Secretary of State for
the Colonies, Cyprus, Cu m. No. 1093, app. D (1960).
96 Draft Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, art. 1,
in Secretary of State for the Colonies, vtpra note 95, app. A, at 13.
97 There are twenty-five, of which thirteen are to be given back to Cyprus "as
soon as practicable." Id. ann. B, pt. II, § 1(2), at 21.
98d. § 4, at 23.
99 Including fifteen camps, buildings, and installations, and right of access thereto.
Ibid.
100 See 196 THE EcONOMIST 250 (1960) : "Few new states have had the condi-
tions of their independence so explicitly and elaborately defined, or have been thrust
so quickly into a rigid mould which they are debarred from changing. Fewer still
have been forced to allow a former ruling power to retain a sovereign toehold on
their territory, as well as other extensive rights."
101 Although, as will be seen below, this question has arisen with claims to limited
participation in United Nations affairs, especially with reference to membership in
the specialized agencies.
102 Rudzinski, supra note 67, at 146-47.
103 It is of interest that Liechtenstein was denied admission to the League of
Nations in 1920 on the grounds that "this state does not appear to be in a position
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The relationship of these two factors is underlined by the admis-
sion to the United Nations of several new states whose physical and
economic resources must be termed "inadequate." However, by virtue
of agreements with their former colonial powers, economic aid is
guaranteed. While such agreements do not infringe upon the inde-
pendence of these states-although all economic dependence implies a
certain degree of political dependence, the choice of sources of aid
available in Africa prevents the dependence on the former colonial
power from being too great-they do help to guarantee, inter alia, that
the nations concerned will be able to carry out their obligations under
the Charter.
Limitations in Conducting Foreign Relations
The traditional literature of international law was much concerned
with the possibility of "dependent states," particularly in cases where
one state had the power to conduct foreign relations for another.
0 4
It might be suggested that every time the United Nations has allowed
an entity which lacks independence in foreign relations to participate in
to carry out all the international obligations imposed by the Covenant." LEAGUE OF
NATIONS OFF. J. 1st Ass. 667 (1920). The report made by the Fifth Committee
to the League Assembly commented, "The Principality of Liechtenstein possesses
a stable government and fixed frontiers. There can be no doubt that juridically
the Principality of Liechtenstein is a sovereign state, but by reason of her limited
area, small population and geographical position, she has chosen to depute to others
some of the attributes of sovereignty. For instance, she has contracted with other
Powers for the control of her customs, and administration of her Posts, Telegraphs
and Telephone Services, for the diplomatic representation of her subjects in foreign
countries, other than Switzerland and Austria, and for final decisions in certain
judicial cases." Luxembourg, however, was admitted without the question of size
being raised. Rudzinski, supra note 67, at 173. Liechtenstein has not applied for
membership in the United Nations.
104 International law has developed beyond and away from the old concept that
only states may be its subjects. See Schwarzenberger, The Protection of Human
Rights in British State Practice, 1 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 153 (1948). See also
Dunn, The International Rights of Individuals, 1941 PROC. Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 14;
Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 63 L.Q. Rav. 438 (1947). Never-
theless, the rejection of a broader phrasing suggested at San Francisco in favor of
the term "state" in article 4 of the Charter indicates that this concept may yet rule
us from its grave. Curiously enough, article 1 of the League of Nations Covenant
expressly permitted the membership not only of states, but of dominions and colonies.
Moreover, whereas only states may be parties before the International Court of Justice,
STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 34, para. 1, the corresponding provision of the Statute of
the Permanent Court of International Justice said that "only states or members of
the League of Nations can be parties before the Court," STAT. PERM. INT'L CT. JUST.
art. 34. (Emphasis added.)
Traditional doctrine and literature upheld the concept of dependent states, though
invariably with reservations as to their "exceptional character." Thus, Oppenheim
affirmed their existence, but noted that not only are dependent states an anomaly,
but the very existence of states without full sovereignty is an anomaly itself. 1
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 114-16 (6th ed. 1947). The same conclusion is
reached by both Hyde and Rolin. 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (2d rev. ed.
1945) ; Rolin, Les principes de Droit International Public, 77 RECEUIL DES COURS
309, 326. Kelsen stands out as a comparatively lone voice in refuting the idea of a
"dependent state." KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 248-52 (1946).
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some activity open only to states, it has either recognized a "dependent
state" or ignored the criterion of statehood. But this argument may be
avoided by recognizing that the term "state" has no fixed meaning,
but varies in content according to the claim for which it is a relevant
consideration. Thus, in considering United Nations practice, the
degree of independence required of an entity before it can be called a
"state" or be permitted to have an international personality depends on
the claim advanced. Where the claim has been for comprehensive par-
ticipation, the United Nations has required the applicant to maintain
a high degree of sovereignty in the conduct of its foreign relations.
It has been suggested that the membership of Luxembourg in the
United Nations indicates the existence of a "dependent state," '05 since
that nation is universally recognized as a sovereign state, in spite of
its abandonment in favor of Belgium of the power to conclude com-
mercial treaties.0 6 However, this example is not conclusive; the
delegation of authority by Luxembourg would not warrant the assump-
tion that it is a dependency. 10 7  Presumably, in much the same way as
the degree of control required to assert successfully rights of prescrip-
tion and acquisition over a territory depends in part upon the conditions
of the territory in question,10 8 the degree of authority exercised by a
protecting state necessary to preserve its protectorship depends upon
all the circumstances. Thus, in such cases as the British relationship
to Muscat or Bahrein, the degree of authority is comparatively slight;
but this suffices, since the occasions for international intercourse by
those nations are infrequent.0 9 The Permanent Court of International
Justice, in the Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees Case, also appeared
to be of opinion that no hard and fast answer can be given as to where
the line which establishes legal dependency is to be drawn."'
105 Rolin, supra note 104, at 326.
106Belgique et Luxembourg, Convention 6stablissant une Union 6conomique le
deux pays, July 25, 1921, 9 L.N.T.S. 224.
107 ST. KOROWICZ, INTRODUCTroN TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 73 (1959), where
it is pointed out that the relations of Luxembourg and Belgium are based upon a
close economic cooperation; from a legal as well as factual viewpoint, nothing
could be stipulated by Belgium which would engage Luxembourg without the clear
consent of the latter.1 08 See Island of Palmas Case (The Netherlands v. United States), 2 U.N. Rep.
Int'l Arb. Awards 829 (1928).
109 Compare the position in Morocco immediately prior to its independence, where
the French protectorate used the services of a French official as Minister of Foreign
Affairs to the Sultan, while in fact the protected state was largely treated as a
separate entity despite the control by the protecting state. See BISHoP, CASES ON
IN ERNATIONAL LAW 154 (1953).
110 P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 4, at 27 (1923) (advisory opinion) : "In spite of common
features possessed by Protectorates under international law, they have individual legal
characteristics resulting from the special conditions under which they were created,
and the stage of their development." It is of interest that when Denmark and Iceland
became members of a union of states by the treaty of Nov. 18, 1918, both remained
sovereign states, even though Denmark undertook to manage Iceland's foreign affairs.
McNAiR, LAW OF TREATIES 434 (1938).
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More specifically, an examination of practice before the General
Assembly and Security Council reveals that the lack of ability of a state
to conduct its own foreign relations has been regarded as significant,"'
and in no case of virtually total limitation upon sovereign rights in this
regard 1" has an entity been admitted to membership in the United
Nations. Perhaps the only genuinely doubtful case is that of Nepal,
which warrants further discussion. Indian influence in Nepal is con-
siderable. Nehru has stated on several occasions that the Himalayas,
which lie to the north of Nepal, are India's northern border. The
1950 treaty of peace and friendship between Nepal and India provides
that Nepal shall accept Indian aid in case of aggression.1 3  There is-
notwithstanding the United States assertion in the Security Council
that Nepal has effective control of its external relations 4 -- the
closest consultation between the two governments on Nepal's foreign
policy. India is kept well informed of Nepalese negotiations with third
powers. However, the formal power to conduct foreign affairs lies
solely with Nepal, and in practice these arrangements, while obliging
her to make information available to the Indian government, have not
substantially impaired her freedom to conduct her own foreign re-
lations." 5
Disabilities Arising from World War II
It was suggested by certain members of the United Nations that
the independence and sovereignty of some of the ex-enemy states had
been affected by various factors resulting from the cessation of hos-
"'1 Thus the Australian delegate thought there was insufficient evidence that
Mongolia was able to conduct its own foreign affairs, SCOR 2d year, Spec. Supp.
No. 3, at 11 (S/95) (1947); while the U.S.S.R. contended that Japan could only
decide foreign policy with instructions from Washington, SCOR 7th year, 602d
meeting 14 (S/PV.602/r.1) (1952). On the question of Israel, the United States
pointed out that Israel possessed this facet of independence; furthermore, "neither
at San Francisco nor subsequently has the United States considered that complete
freedom to frame and manage one's own foreign policy was an essential requisite
of United Nations membership"' SCOR 3d year, 383d meeting 10-12 (S/PV.383)
(1948).
112 .g., Monaco, San Marino, Andorra.
113 July 31, 1950, 2 INDIAN YB. OF INT'L AFFAIRS 316-13 (1953). Rubin, The
Sino-Indian Border Disputes, 9 IN'L & Comp. L.Q. 96 n.6 (1960), pertinently com-
ments on the apparent incompatibility of Nepalese membership in the United Nations
with Nehru's statements of November 27, 1959, to the effect that India will consider
any aggression directed against Nepal as an aggression against India, The Times
(London), Nov. 28, 1959, p. 6, col. 1.
"14 SCOR 4th year, 439th meeting 12 (S/PV.439) (1949).
"15 Rubin, supra note 113, at 115, concludes that the limitations upon Nepal's
external affairs in no way suffice to justify any classification of Nepal as less than
a full international person. A full analysis of the extent of Indian influence and
prior English influence in Nepal may be found in Prudente, Admission to the United
Nations as a Diplomatic Instrument, June 1959 (unpublished thesis in Univ. of
Southern California Library). See also Levi, Nepal in World Politics, 33 PAcmc
AFFAIRs 239 (1957).
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tilities in favor of the Allies. The question arose as to whether a
defeated state with whom a peace treaty had not yet been signed and
which was occupied by foreign troops retained a sufficient degree of
state sovereignty to render it eligible for membership under Article 4."6
Both the Soviet Union and Australia initially objected to the
admission of Austria 117 on the grounds that a nation could not be
regarded as sovereign or independent when it was occupied by foreign
troops and subject to armistice agreements. 8 The United States, on
the other hand, rejected the blind application in all cases of the thesis
that restrictions in armistice agreements or other control arrangements
were of such a nature as to impair sovereignty."9 The United States
government felt that this question and that of military occupation
should be resolved by the facts in each individual case, and in the
present instance, it was argued, the new control agreement '0 provided
that Austria might exercise independent authority.
The same controversy arose over the application for admission of
Italy. The United States emphasized that for all practical purposes
Italy was not restricted in sovereignty.' The Allied Commission had
been terminated on January 31, 1947, and no troops remained in Italy
but a token force along the northeast frontier maintained solely to insure
a peaceful solution to the border dispute with Austria.'2, No voices were
raised in opposition, since it was in the general interest that Italy, which
had been designated the administering authority of the trusteeship of
Somaliland, 2 3 should become a full member of the United Nations and
a member of the Trusteeship Council.' 4
316 This issue is quite distinct from whether a defeated aggressor-state with whom
a peace treaty has not yet been signed may be deemed "peace-loving"; and from any
rights of adverse vote which may accrue to the Allies under Article 107.
117 Australian opposition to Austrian admission became modified when her gov-
ernment became of the opinion that the delay of the entry into force of the peace
treaties was being caused by the unilateral failure of the U.S.S.R. to ratify them.
However, Australia still maintained that a technical ineligibility for membership
persisted, and that the most that could be done under the circumstances was for
conditional recommendations to be made to the General Assembly. SCOR 2d year,
Spec. Supp. No. 3, app. 14 (S/335) (1947).
118 SCOR 2d year, Spec. Supp. No. 3, apps. 14, 15 (S/403) (1947).
"9 SCOR 2d year, 190th meeting 2128 (S/479) (1947).
120 Agreement with the United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
the French Republic on the Machinery of Control in Austria, June 28, 1946, 15 DEP'T
STATE BuLL. 175 (1946).
121 SCOR 2d year, Spec. Supp. No. 3, app. 45 (S/355) (1947).
122 SCOR 2d year, 190th meeting 2120 (S/479) (1947); SCOR 2d year, 203d
meeting 2408-09 (S/PV.203/r.1) (1947); SCOR 2d year, Spec. Supp. No. 3, at 20
(S/355) (1947).
12= GAOR 4th Sess., Resolutions No. 289(IV), at 10 (1949).
124 U.N. CHARTER art. 86, para. 1 states that "The Trusteeship Council shall consist
of the following members of the United Nations: (a) those members administering
trust territories . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
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One of the arguments raised by the Soviet Union against the
admission of Japan was that it was still under the control of the occupa-
tion forces ..5 and that consideration of the application should be post-
poned until Japan had concluded normal peace treaties with the
U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China, which would signify that
Japan had again become an independent and sovereign country.2
However, it would seem that the sovereignty of Japan had never really
been compromised. The occupying power-in this case the United
States-had allowed the Emperor and his government to remain in
Japan during the occupation; there was no reason to suppose that
sovereignty had been transferred to the occupying power.-
7
There is no doubt that belligerent occupation without annexation
does not cause a transfer of sovereignty. 28  However, a distinction
should be drawn between belligerent occupation stricto senu during
hostilities and occupation after the cessation of hostilities. 2 I would
concur with those authorities 1.30 who suggest that occupation in pur-
suance of armistice terms is governed by the rules contained therein.3 '
Certainly at the time of admission to membership of the ex-enemy states
none had had its sovereignty or independence curtailed to any notice-
125 SCOR 7th year, 601st meeting 9 (S/2754) (1952).
126Id. at 12. The United States had concluded a separate peace treaty with
Japan on September 8, 1951, [1952] 3 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 3172. By Article l(b) "The
Allied Powers recognize the full sovereignty of the Japanese people over Japan and
its territorial waters." Ibid.
127 See Far Eastern Comm'n, Policy Decision on Basic Post-Surrender Policy
for Japan, June 19, 1947, part II, para. 2, 17 DF2'T STATE BULL. 216, 217 (1947),
which provided that the Supreme Commander "will exercise his authority through
Japanese governmental machines and agencies, including the Emperor
128 HAGUE RULES OF LAND WARFARE arts. 42-56 (1907).
129 See STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 639 (1954). Stone
notes that postwar occupation may be either in pursuance of armistice terms or under
a peace treaty. An example of the latter is the occupation of the Rhineland after
the Treaty of Versailles. See Agreement with Belgium, the British Empire, and
Germany with Regard to the Military Occupation of the Territories of the Rhine,
June 28, 1919, in 13 AM. J. INT'L L. 404-09 (Supp. 1919). 2 GUGGENHEIM, LEHRBUcH
DES V6LKERRECHTS, 926 (1951), adds an additional category of occupation "sui
generis" under which he lists the occupation of Germany and Japan.
130 FRIEDMANN, THE ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY (1947); 2
OppENHEim & LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 602-04 (8th ed. 1955); STONE,
op. cit. supra note 129, at 639; Borton, United States Occupation Policies in Japan
Since Surrender, 62 POL. ScI. Q. 250 (1947); Lowenstein, Law and the Legislative
Process in Occupied Germany (pts. 1 & 2), 57 YALE L.J. 722, 994 (1947).
131 It has been suggested that the Declaration of Berlin of June 5, 1945, 12 DEPT
STATE BULL. 1051 (1945), by which the Major Allied powers assumed supreme
authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the German
government, the high command, and any state, municipal or local government or
authority, caused a transfer of sovereignty to take place without the normally neces-
sary annexation. Jennings, Government in Commission, 23 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 112
(1946); Kelsen, The Legal Status of Germany According to the Declaration of
Berlin, 39 Am. J. INT'L L. 518 (1945) ; Simpson, Berlin: Allied Rights and Respmsi-
bilities in the Divided City, 6 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 83 (1957). See also Bottrill, Ex
parte Kuechenineister, 1 Am. EcoN. Rxv. 635 (1946).
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able degree by foreign occupation, subjection to armistice arrange-
ments, or other disabilities arising from the war.32
Absence of Diplomatic Relations
The importance of diplomatic relations has been stressed by both
East and West, not merely as a manifestation of ability and willingness
to carry out the obligations of the Charter, but in relation to the very
existence of independence. Nevertheless, it is difficult to determine
whether the majority of members believe that limited diplomatic rela-
tions automatically imply a lack of sovereignty and independence or
merely provide prima facie evidence of a limitation on an entity's inde-
pendence. Some claims have also been made that the absence of diplo-
matic relations-especially relations with certain individual states-in
no way reflects upon the status of the country concerned.
China called attention to the fact that Mongolia had very limited
diplomatic and consular relations; 133 and others, while paying lip
service to the argument of the United States that this was irrelevant,
nevertheless appeared to treat the matter as not entirely insignificant. 34
Similarly, in the discussion in the Committee on Admissions, the
Soviet representative noted that his government attached great sig-
nificance to the point that Transjordan did not maintain diplomatic
relations with Russia.'35 This was not, he added, mere formal argu-
ment, but a "very important reason . . . [touching] upon the quali-
ties of a nation applying for membership." 136 He conceded that at
San Francisco some countries had participated which did not have
normal diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R., but stated that this was
due to wartime circumstances which no longer existed.'
132 For example, although Syria noted that Austria did not have international
recognition of its existence as a sovereign state after the Anschluss, and was not
considered a separate enemy state during the war, the United States asserted that
Austria had "corporate identity" and pointed out that the Moscow declaration had
declared null and void the annexation of Austria by Germany. SCOR 2d year, 154th
meeting 1262-63 (S/406) (1947) ; SCOR 2d year, 190th meeting 2128 (S/506) (1947).
133 SCOR 1st year, 2d ser., Supp. No. 4, at 64-65 (S/95) (1946); GAOR 1st
Sess., pt. 2, First Committee 61 (A/C.1/30) (1946).
134 Thus the United Kingdom representative "thought it would be useful to know
whether the Mongolian People's Republic would be willing to extend her diplomatic
relations to the outer world," SCOR 1st year, 2d ser., Supp. No. 4, at 66 (S/506)
(1946), while the Australian delegate was at pains to add as an extra reason for
doubting the independence of Mongolia the fact that she only had diplomatic relations
with the U.S.S.R., SCOR 2d year, Spec. Supp. No. 3, at 11 (S/95) (1947).
135 SCOR 1st year, 2d ser., 56th meeting 91-92 (S/101) (1946); SCOR 1st
year, Supp. No. 4, at 72 (S/101) (1946); SCOR 2d year, Spec. Supp. No. 3, at 14-15
(S/101) (1947).
136 SCOR Zd year, Spec. Supp. No. 3, at 14 (S/101) (1947).
137 SCOR 1st year, 2d ser., 56th meeting 91-92 (S/101) (1946).
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Conversely, both the United States and France cited the existence
of diplomatic relations as an indication of the independence of Nepal.1"8
The Nepalese government itself declared that Nepal "has for centuries
been an independent sovereign state . . .. [It] is responsible for
its own foreign relations and no power exercises, or for centuries has
exercised, any control or authority over it except its own govern-
ment." "' The point has been raised on several other occasions.
140
I would suggest that diplomatic relations between the applicant
and any one other state are in no way required to prove independence,
but that a marked absence of diplomatic relations with other states may,
in the circumstances of the individual case, indicate a limitation on the
independence of the nation concerned. Certainly no state has been
admitted to full membership in the United Nations after a showing of
abnormally limited diplomatic exchanges, although this may be a result
of a finding of unwillingness or inability to carry out Charter respon-
sibilities.
Recognition
Discussions of recognition in United Nations practice have not
only stressed unnecessary technicalities, but shown a tendency to deal
with a variety of related but distinct topics as one problem. 4 For the
138 SCOR 4th year, 439th meeting 8, 12 (S/1382) (1949).
139 U.N. Doc. No. S/C.3/16, at 3 (1949). In this regard Prudente, op. cit.
supra note 115, notes that for a long time Britain and then India had the only
resident ambassadors in Katmandu. Later the United States, France, and others
established diplomatic relations. Under a 1955 treaty, Communist China and Nepal
agreed to exchange ambassadors. However, at the wish of India, those countries'
ambassadors accredited to New Delhi are those accredited to each other. Apparently
the Chinese have circumvented this position by sending other diplomatic officials
directly to Nepal while the Chinese ambassador to India and Nepal continues to
reside in New Delhi, as provided in the agreement. The U.S.S.R., after dealing with
Katmandu through Peiping, established formal diplomatic relations with Nepal in
March 1957.
140By the French delegate with reference to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos,
SCOR 7th year, 602d meeting 16, 17 (S/PV.602/R.1) (1952), and by the Australian
representative with reference to Ceylon, GAOR 3d Sess., pt. 1, Ad Hoc Pol. Comm.
132 (A/AC.24/14) (1948).
141 There has been no greater profusion of writing and comment by interna-
tional jurists than on the subject of recognition and the United Nations. Profusion
has led to confusion, and there has been a tendency to deal with a variety of related,
but nevertheless distinct, topics as one problem: these include recognition of states
by other states; recognition of governments by other states; "collective recognition"
by the United Nations; the recognition of credentials; the recognition of the repre-
sentatives of a member state of the United Nations; recognition and the Stimson
doctrine; recognition, intervention and self-determination. See, e.g., LAUTERPAcHT,
REcOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1947); MAREK, IDENTITY AND CONTINUITY
OF STATES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1954); Aufricht, Principles and Prac-
tices of Recognition by International Organizations, 43 Am. J. INT'L L. 679 (1949) ;
Briggs, Non-Recognition of Title by Conquest and Limitations on the Doctrine,
1940 PROC. Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 72; Kelsen, Recognition in International Law, 35
Am. J. INT'L L. 605 (1941) ; Wright, Recognition and Self-Determination, 1954
PROC. Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 23.
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purposes of this Article, recognition is of importance only insofar as it
relates to the "statehood" which is required for admission to com-
prehensive participation in the United Nations. Moreover, it must be
viewed not as an all-explaining and mystical concept, but as another
piece of evidence to be weighed in determining whether an entity is a
"state" in relation to a specific claim."
In connection with claims to admission to the United Nations,
several delegations have emphasized the fact of widespread recognition
or nonrecognition of an applicant state. Thus it was pointed out that
the Republic of Korea had been afforded collective recognition as a
state by the General Assembly by Resolution 195 (111),"' and had
been recognized by more than thirty governments.'44 Supporters
of South Vietnam also emphasized that it had been recognized by more
than forty states.' 45 It was likewise considered relevant that Mongolia
was recognized not only by Russia and China, but also by India,
Indonesia, and Burma.'46
Perhaps the most interesting case in which the question of recog-
nition was raised was that of Israel. The United States recognized
the state of Israel immediately following the declaration of its inde-
pendence. It was suggested in some quarters that this recognition was
premature, 47 being granted before it was possible adequately to ascer-
tain all the facts. The United States delegate, however, insisted that
the act of recognition was purely political, and could not properly be
questioned. 4 ' Other supporters of the admission of Israel cited
142 This inevitably begs some legal questions, especially the well-tried issue of
the declaratory versus the constitutive view of recognition; for if recognition is
indeed constitutive, its existence does not provide mere evidence of independence to
be weighed along with other evidence, but being a prerequisite of statehood, it is
also final proof. The controversy has been too voluminously discussed elsewhere to
warrant further comment here. See, propounding the declaratory view, BRIGGS, THE
LAw OF NATIONS 109 (3d ed. 1942) ; LAUTERPACaT, op. cit. supra note 141; Williams,
La Doctrine de la Reconnaissance en Droit International et ses Diveloppelnents
Ricents, 44 REcEuI. DES CouRs 203, 237 (1933). The constitutive view is espoused
in Redslob, La reconnaisance de l'Etat coinine suiet de droit international, 13 REVUE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 434 (1934) ; SpiRoPouLos, TRArrT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIc 48 (1933). Suffice it to say that the author adheres to that view which
regards recognition of statehood as declaratory of existing objective norms of inter-
national law and fact. No amount of recognition can make what is not a state into
a state; and no amount of nonrecognition can convert what is a state-by all the
legal criteria enunciated above-into a nonstate.
143 GAOR 3d Sess., pt. 1, Resolutions No. 195(111) (1948). For an interesting
discussion of the effect of such resolutions on member states of the United Nations-
including those who voted against the resolution-see Rosenne, Recognition of States
by the United Nations, 26 BRiT. YB. INT'L L. 437, 441 (1949).
144 GAOR 11th Sess., Spec. Pol. Comm. 77 (A/25) (1957).
145 Ibid.
146 GAOR 15th Sess., 988th meeting 41 (A/PV.988) (1961) ; GAOR 15th Sess.,
989th meeting 8 (A/PV.989) (1961).
147 See MAREK, op. cit. mipra note 141, at 156. See also Brown, The Recognition
of Israel, 42 Am. J. INT'L L. 620 (1948).
148 In an oft-quoted statement, Representative Warren Austin declared: "I should
regard it as highly improper for me to admit that any country on earth can question
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the fact of recognition as evidence of independence: both the Nether-
lands and Greece emphasized that they had recognized Israel,'149 while
Uruguay stressed that fifty-two nations had recognized the state of
Israel by the time of the debate.5
United Nations practice undeniably reveals that most member
states have considered the issue of recognition as relevant; this rele-
vance, however, lies in the fact .that it is useful evidence of the inter-
national status of an applicant, and the material available in no way
implies that recognition is an essential prerequisite to independence.151
CLAIM TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES
If the term "state" has no absolute fixed meaning, but rather
takes on varying implications in accordance with the claim for which
it is being used, then it is likely that entities which would not be
considered states in relation to a claim for comprehensive participation
in the United Nations might nevertheless satisfy the requirements of
statehood where the claim is for limited participation. 152  This is true
although a successful claim under this head carries rights wider than
the claim itself: an admitted member of a specialized agency derives
additional rights to participate in conferences, become a party to
treaties, and the like.
Not all of the constitutions of the specialized agencies provide that
membership shall be limited to "states"; where they do not, questions as
to their membership are beyond the scope of this Article. However,
certain agency constitutions expressly use the term "state," 153 and in
the sovereignty of the United States of America in the exercise of that highly political
act of recognition of the de facto status of a state. Moreover, I would not admit
here, by implication or by direct answer, that there exists a tribunal of justice or of
any other kind, anywhere, that can pass upon the legality or validity of that act of
my country." SCOR 3d year, 294th meeting 16 (S/749) (1948). In a later session,
Mr. Jessup drew a distinction between the de lure recognition which had been given
to the state of Israel and the de facto recognition that had been given to its pro-
visional government. SCOR 3d year, 385th meeting 12 (S/1093) (1948).
1 GAOR 3d Sess., pt. 2, Ad Hoc Pol. Comm. 318, 323 (A/818) (1949).
15o Id. at 298.
151 No case study of the recognition of Communist China has been included under
this head, in the belief that this is not a problem of statehood stricto sensu, but
rather a problem of the representation of an undeniably existent state, that of China.
It is, of course, quite possible to approach the problem with the view that by now
two separate states of China may exist.
152 Membership in the United Nations and in the specialized agencies are not
automatically tied together; it is quite possible to be a member of a specialized
agency without being a member of the parent organization. Likewise, it is possible
to be a member of the parent without belonging to any of its offspring, although
this raises no questions of statehood.
153 The membership requirements are as follows: Interational Atomic Energy
Agency: "states members" of the UN or of specialized agencies who ratify within
ninety days, other states upon approval of the General Conference after recommenda-
tion of the Board of Governors. STAT. INT'L ATomIc ENERGY AGENcY art. IV, para B.
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these cases it is of interest to examine the membership of the agencies
with a view to ascertaining how closely the traditional legal criteria
have been followed. Such an examination will reveal that several
entities whose international status is sufficiently in doubt for them
never to have applied for admission to the United Nations, or for their
application to have been refused, are nonetheless members of certain
specialized agencies open only to states. Thus, the Republic of Korea
is a member of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), the World Health Organization (WHO),
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the Uni-
versal Postal Union (UPU) ; the Republic of Vietnam is a member of
the International Labor Organization (ILO), UNESCO, WHO, and
UPU; Monaco is a member of UNESCO, WHO, and UPU; and San
Marino and the Holy See belong to UPU. 54
There are three alternative theories to explain the dilemma that
some entities which are not states with respect to comprehensive par-
ticipation do satisfy the statehood requirement for membership in the
specialized agencies. First, this may be an example of political oppor-
tunism in treating as states entities which lack the basic characteristics
which that term implies. Second, although political convenience may
not have led to a failure to observe the fundamental juridical criteria of
statehood, political intransigence may have led to the opposite abuse
of denying admission to entities possessing the attributes of a state.
Finally, and, it is suggested, most properly, the explanation may lie
in an acknowledgment that a less rigorous interpretation of the term
"state" is used when a limited claim is made than when comprehensive
participation is sought.
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: "countries." BANK ARTS.
OF AGREEMENT, art. 1. International Civil Aviation Organization: "contracting states"
who ratify the convention. ICAO CONVENTION art. 48. UNESCO: members of the
UN (automatic membership) or nonmember "states" who are admitted after a recom-
mendation of the Executive Board by a two-thirds vote of the General Conference.
UNESCO CONST. art. 2. Food and Agriculture Organization: "nation." FAQ
CONST. art. 2. World Health Organization: "membership . . . shall be open to all
states." WHO CoNsT. art 3. International Labor Organization: "states." ILO
CONST. art. 2. International Maritime Conmltative Organization: "states," associate
membership available to "territories or groups of territories." IMCO CoNvrETIox
arts. 5-9. World Meteorological Organization: "territories and countries," under cer-
tain conditions. WMO CONsT. art. 3. International Monetary Fund: "countries."
FUND ARTS. OF AGREEmENT art. 2. Universal Postal Union: "any sovereign coun-
try." UPU CONST. art. 3(1). International Telecommunication Union: original
membership, "country or group of territories"; later membership, UN member
"country," or non-UN member "sovereign country." ITU CONVENTION art. 2.
15 4 Liechtenstein and Andorra, interestingly enough, are not members of any
specialized agencies, although Liechtenstein maintains certain relations with the
United Nations through the International Court of Justice. See notes 184-85
infra and accompanying text. It should perhaps be added that the Federal Republic
of Germany-a "divided state" stricto sensu, but nonetheless recognized as a sovereign
state by Russia-is a member of all those agencies restricted to "states."
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In support of the second theory, it has been argued that the reason
that certain "divided states" are members of specialized agencies but
not of the United Nations lies in the availability of the veto in the
Security Council and its absence in the specialized agencies. While
this seems a markedly realistic contention with respect to "divided
states," the nonmembership of the "diminutive states" in the United
Nations would seem to favor the view that the content of the term
"state" may vary according to the claim involved, since these entities
are inoffensive to both East and West. Nevertheless, it must in fair-
ness be noted that none of the "diminutive states" has ever applied for
membership in the United Nations itself, although there is the precedent
of the rejection of the application of Liechtenstein for admission to the
League of Nations. 55  Ultimately, then, this question is still open for
interpretation. However, since there is no need to accept the view that
law has ceased to play a real role in problems of statehood in United
Nations practice, I would reject it in favor of the theory that the
membership in specialized agencies of certain entities which have been,
or would have been likely to have been, refused membership in the
United Nations is due to the necessity of interpreting the term "state"
in the light of the claim being made and not to the opportunity for
political abuse presented by the veto in the United Nations. 5
It must also be remembered that a refusal to admit a nation to a
specialized agency restricted to states may be made on other grounds
155 See note 103 supra.
156 The interpretation tentatively advanced here does entail the consequence that
an applicant may be a "state" for some purposes and not for others. Whether or
not this is desirable is a matter for discussion. It would seem to have advantages
in that participation will not be refused to politically controversial applicants by
organizations concerned with humanitarian work, if it is generally felt that "state-
hood" for this purpose does not necessarily constitute statehood for all purposes.
How far membership in a specialized agency is in fact "the thin end of the wedge"
to automatic acknowledgment of statehood in other contexts is not entirely clear
from the available evidence. Certainly other consequences follow from limited par-
ticipation-the new member will receive invitations to international conferences, will
be able to be party to international treaties, etc. However, the consequences may
still fall short of full participation. The future progress of Kuwait and Mauretania
to membership in the United Nations may prove enlightening in this context. Kuwait,
which has not yet applied for membership in the United Nations, is a member of
UNESCO and ICAO; Mauretania, whose application was blocked by the Soviet
veto due to the nonconsideration by the Security Council of the application of Mon-
golia-though in fact Mauretania's status may indeed be doubtful-has now been
recommended for membership in WHO. WHO Press Release H/1685, Feb. 15, 1961.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the doctrine of estoppel may be relevant in
this context. There would seem to be force in the contention that states voting for
admission of an entity to an agency limited to "states" are estopped from denying its
statehood in relation to any other claim to full sovereignty, such as to membership
in the United Nations. However, in actual fact the entry into membership of
specialized agencies by controversial entities is invariably accompanied by express
reservations as to the limits of such recognition by those states who wish to protect
their future positions on this issue, and there appears to be nothing objectionable in
this practice.
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than that the entity is not a state; furthermore, the issue of statehood
takes a place of lesser significance in a vote for admission to a specialized
agency than it would in the consideration of a claim for comprehensive
participation.
An examination of the practice of the agencies bears this out. By
agreement with the United Nations ... applications for membership in
UNESCO by states not members of the United Nations are transmitted
to the Economic and Social Council (EcoSoc), which may recom-
mend the rejection of such applications. UNESCO is bound to accept
such a recommendation. 58  The application of Austria was approved
by the Council without comment, following an assurance that Austria
was in fact entitled to enter into international agreements.' 59 The
Council approved the applications of the Federal Republic of Germany,
Japan, and Vietnam at its twelfth session, 60 though certain delegates
voiced the opinion that the very existence of West Germany was
illegal, that Japan was incapacitated by the absence of a peace treaty,
and that Vietnam was not a sovereign state representing the people.
However, the view prevailed that a rigid adherence to technicalities was
unnecessary. This was expressed in the comments of the representative
of the United Kingdom, who thought that the aim of universality was
of great importance, and that so long as the applicant had sufficient
independence to conduct foreign affairs in its own name and was
completely independent in that sphere of activity covered by the agency
concerned, total independence was not necessary.' 6' The representative
of Pakistan went even further, and thought that in view of the purposes
of UNESCO, the applications should be considered from the standpoint
of the advantages that the countries concerned might achieve.' 6' The
application of Monaco is of special interest. EcoSoc, in giving its
approval,'163 recommended that UNESCO, in considering the applica-
tion, should "take into account what contribution Monaco can make in
furthering the programme of the Organization." ' It further sug-
157 Agreement Between U.N. and UNESCO, July 10, 1948, art. 2, in 2 PEASLEE,
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 724 (1956).
158 "[A]ny such recommendations shall be accepted by the Organization." Ibid.
An interesting point arose in reference to the application of Ceylon as to whether
EcoSoc could only reject applicants, or whether it could also recommend their ad-
mission. The latter interpretation prevailed. 3 REPERTORY OF PRACTICE OF UNITED
NATIONS ORGANS 243 (1955).
159U.N. EcoSoc OFF. REc. 4th Sess., Res. No. 59 (E/437) (1947).
160U.N. EcoSoc OFF. REc. 12th Sess., 468th meeting 258-62 (E/1883), (E/
1883/Add. 1 & 2) (1951).
161 Id. at 258.
162 U.N. EcoSoc OFF. REc. 12th Sess., 468th meeting at 260 (E/1883), (E/1883
Add. 1, 2) (1951).
163 U.N. EcoSoc OFF. REc. 8th Sess., 129th Meeting 55 (E/568/Add. 1) (1948).
M Id. ann. 18.
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gested that UNESCO should consider "the general problem of the
admission of similar diminutive States." 165
Similar provisions exist in the case of the International Civil
Aviation Organization. Here the General Assembly has the power
to reject an application.'06 At its second session the Assembly ap-
proved the application of Austria, in spite of one representative's doubts
as to Austria's freedom in the matter of civil aviation pending the
signing of a peace treaty.'67 Similarly, a resolution on Japan's admis-
sion was passed 53-0 with 6 abstentions.68
The practice of the World Health Organization is instructive in
revealing a desire for universality which will blur the lines of statehood,
but not reject them entirely. The application for membership by
Monaco was accepted, after a report by the Legal Committee, but with
emphasis that the decision was not to constitute a precedent.' 69 Vietnam
was also admitted to membership, with little opposition being ex-
pressed. 7 0  The application of the Republic of Korea met with the
opposition that was to be expected from the representatives of the
communist states. The United States emphasized the number of
countries which had recognized South Korea, the fact that it was
competent to conduct its own foreign affairs, and the desirability of
universal membership. 17' It was left to the Liberian representative to
comment that "diseases know no national boundaries." 172 It is of
interest, however, that the Report of the Working Party of the Com-
mittee on Constitutional Matters recommended that South Korea be
refused admission.'7 3  The report was rejected . 4  On the other hand,
the Second Assembly of WHO refused to accept the application of
San Marino, apparently on the ground that a reservation was attached
as to the amount of financial contribution it could hope to make.
Doubts had already been raised as to San Marino's statehood, and
when these were combined with a financial inability to play a full role,
165 U.N. EcoSoc OFF. REc. 8th Sess., 129th Meeting at ann. 18 (E/568/Add. 1)
(1948). That this resolution has borne fruit may be seen in the fact that the applica-
tion of Kuwait has also received the blessing of the council. U.N. EcoSoc OFF. REc.
30th Sess., Supp. No. 1 (E/3422) (1960).
166 Agreement between UN and ICAO, May 31, 1948, art. 2, in 2 PEAs=_, op.
cit. supra note 157, at 75.
167 GAOR 2d Sess., Plenary 562-64 (A/434) (1947).
168 GAOR 7th Sess., Plenary 182-83 (A/2176 & Add. 1) (1952). Note also
that Kuwait became the seventy-eighth member of ICAO on June 17, 1960. ICAO
News Release, June 17, 1960.
109 WHO OFF. REc. 1st Ass., Plenary 10th meeting 76 (1948).
17 0 WHO OFF. REc. 3d Ass., Plenary 5th meeting 126-27 (1950).
11 WHO OFF. REc. 2d Ass., Plenary 10th meeting 122-23 (1949).
172 Id. at 123.
'I WHO OFF. REc. 2d Ass., Comm. on Constitutional Matters 10th meeting 312
(A/L612) (1949).
174Id. at 312-14.
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it was decided to reject an applicant who was offensive to none on
political grounds." 5
The records of the selection committee of the International Labor
Organization show a very detailed examination of the legal eligibility of
applicants. It regarded as relevant in its recommendation to admit
Vietnam the fact that that state was widely recognized and that its
government controlled three-fifths of the territory of the country and
four-fifths of the population." 6 The French delegate, discussing the
report, emphasized the fact that since France was no longer in a
position to implement the internal administration of Vietnam, the labor
conventions which had been concluded by France and applied to
Vietnam would lapse if Vietnam were not admitted.' This realistic
approach carried force."7 The discussions of the application of the
Federal Republic of Germany reveal a sharp division of opinion. The
United States representative emphasized the desirability of universality,
and the United Kingdom representative viewed admission as a com-
mitment by the applicant to democratic ways. Israel opposed the
admission on nonlegal grounds, while the Czechoslovakian and Polish
delegates declared themselves dissatisfied with the international status
of the Federal Republic of Germany.' 9
It can thus be seen that in relation to this limited claim, the term
"state" has a less distinct relationship to the traditional legal criteria
than when used in reference to comprehensive admission to the United
Nations. Partial lack of independence may be compensated for by an
ability to fulfill the aims of the particular agency,'80 or by an overriding
policy consideration of the desirability of universality of membership.'
8 '
175 Working Party, Report, WHO OFF. REc. 2d Ass., Comm. on Constitutional
Matters, 10th meeting 312 (1949).
176 Selection Comm., 10th Report, INT'L LABOR CoNF. REc. PROc. 33d Sess., pt 3
(app. II) 403 (1950).
1-7 Id. pt. 2, at 187.
1
7 8 The resolution was carried 132-0, 11 abstentions. Selection Comm., 10th
Report, INT'L LABOR CONF. REc. PROC. 33d Sess., pt. 2, 191 (1950). The Indian dele-
gate announced that he would support this application, but would also have supported
one from Vietminh, as universality was paramount.
179 The Czechoslovakian government delegate pointed out that sovereignty could
not be conjured up by the letter from the Secretary General of the Allied High Com-
mission for Germany stating that in the event of admission, the Commission would not
exercise any of the powers reserved to it under the Revised Occupation Statute in such
a way as to prevent or hinder the fulfilment of the responsibilities of the Federal
Republic of Germany attaching to membership in the ILO. Vis-A-vis a claim for
comprehensive admission, one must concede a certain cogency in this argument. The
resolution in favor of admission was carried 165-12. Selection Comm., 3d Report,
INT'L LABOR CONF. REC. PROC. 33d Sess. 506 (1950).
180 For a concise summary of the aims of the various specialized agencies of the
United Nations, see ASHER, UNITED NATIONS AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CooPERA-
TioN, app. B (1954).
381 Similar trends in other specialized agencies may also be traced. Thus the
Federal Republic of Germany is also a member of the Intergovernmental Maritime
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CLAIMS To BE PARTY TO THE STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Article 93 of the United Nations Charter states:
1. All Members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties
to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
2. A State which is not a Member of the United Nations
may become a party to the Statute of the International Court of
Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the Gen-
eral Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.
Consequently, it seems that if an entity which is not a member of
the United Nations applies to become a party to the Statute of the
Court under Article 93(2), the issue of its statehood must be passed
upon. Further, Article 35 (2) of the Statute of the Court provides:
The conditions under which the Court shall be open to other
States [i.e., those not parties to the Statute] shall, subject to the
special provisions contained in treaties in force, be laid down by
the Security Council, but in no case shall such conditions place
the parties in a position of inequality before the Court.
Here again, the reference is to "states," and is consonant with Article
34(1) of the Statute.8 2 Although neither Article 93(2) of the
Charter nor Article 35 (2) of the Statute refers to independent states,
both a contextual reading of the instruments and state practice 183 con-
firm that this is what was meant by the authors.
Consultative Organization, which restricts full membership to "states." IMCO
CONST. arts. 5-9. At its second session, on March 2, 1960, the IMCO Council upheld
the position of the Secretary General of that Organization that the application for
membership of the Democratic Republic of Germany contained in letter of January
25, 1960, was to be refused. The ground given was lack of sovereignty. The argu-
ments of the applicant that no discretion as to membership was left to the organization
and that sea power was the paramount consideration did not prevail. Further cor-
respondence on behalf of the applicant is contained in a letter of April 30, and repro-
duced in a letter of June 16, 1960, from the Secretary General which was circulated
to the Secretary of State of the United States government. Monaco, Korea, and
Vietnam are members of the International Atomic Energy Agency, whose member-
ship provisions refer only to "states" and, further, declare that "the Agency is based
on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members." IAEA STAT. art.
IV(c). For practice of the Universal Postal Union with regard to Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania, see UPU, Report, EcoSoc OFF. REc. 7th Sess., 220th meeting (E/811),
(E/1030) (1947).
182 "Only States may be parties in cases before the Court"
183 This is illustrated in RosENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT oF JUsTicE 235-36
(1957), which cites the fact that in the United States Nationals in Morocco Case,
[1951] I.C.J. Rep. 109, 110, the applicant government, France, specifically stated in
answer to a query from the court, that the French Republic was proceeding both
on its account and as protecting power in Morocco, the judgment to be "binding upon
France and Morocco." Rosenne also cites The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, [1953]
I.C.J. Rep. 47; The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 2
(1924) ; Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees Case, P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 4 (1923);
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A claim to become a party to the Statute of the Court is a claim to
limited participation. A fortiori, this is true of a claim to appear
before the Court on a single occasion. The undoubted desirability of
having as many states as possible subject to the compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the Court and, reciprocally, with access to the Court, together
with the fact that the claim is of a limited nature, provide the expecta-
tion that in this context the term "state" will be interpreted liberally,
that is, will bear a slightly less distinct relationship to the formal legal
criteria of statehood. Practice bears out this expectation; both
Liechtenstein and San Marino are parties to the Statute of the Court
under Article 93(2) .184 The application of Liechtenstein received
some opposition, mainly on the ground that it does not conduct its own
foreign relations, from which it was argued that it was not an inde-
pendent state. 5  The application of San Marino was also opposed in
some quarters,86 one of the reasons being that it was a diminutive
state. For these reasons, inter alia, the U.S.S.R. abstained from vot-
ing in the Security Council. It also abstained from voting on the
Japanese application, 8 7 on the ground that Japan's sovereignty at the
time was to be doubted by reason of the fact that that country main-
tained no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union."8 However, the
majority of the Security Council and General Assembly felt that these
nations possessed sufficient'international status for them to be deemed
"states" for the purposes of Article 93 (2) ; accordingly, they became
parties to the Statute 8 9 on the same conditions as had been laid down
for Switzerland.
The Oscar Chinn Case, P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 63 (1934); and the Phosphates in
Morocco Case, P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 74 (1938), as evidence of the fact that only
independent states may be parties in cases before the court. He points out that not
all international tribunals have denied dependent states possessing some measure of
international personality the procedural capacity to appear before them: thus in the
Ottoman Public Debt Arbitration (Bulgaria, Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, Greece,
Italy, Turkey), 1 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 529 (1925), the Levant states under
French mandate and Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan under British mandate, were
parties.
184The first nonmember of the United Nations to be a party to the court's
Statute was Switzerland, whose status as a state was, of course, never in doubt.
The Security Council recommended that it become a party on condition it accept
the Statute and the obligations of Article 94 of the Charter, and contribute to the
expenses of the court. SCOR 1st year, 2d ser., Supp. No. 7, at 157 (S/185) (1946);
GAOR Ist Sess., pt. 2, Resolutions No. 91 (A/64) (1946).
'85 SCOR 4th year, 432d meeting 3 (S/1342) (1949); GAOR 4th Sess., 6th
Comm. 214 (A/967) (1949).
186 SCOR 8th year, 641st meeting 2 (S/3137) (1953).
187 Japan subsequently became a member of the United Nations in December
1956; hence Japan is now a party to the Statute of the court under Article 93, para. 1
of the Charter.
188 SCOR 8th year, 641st meeting 2 (S/3126) (1953).
189 GAOR 4th Sess., Resolutions No. 363 (A/1251) (1949) (Liechtenstein);
GAOR 8th Sess., Resolutions No. 805 (A/2630) (1953) (Japan); GAOR 8th Sess.,
Resolutions No. 806 (A/2630) (1953) (San Marino).
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The same tendency is revealed in practice under Article 35(2).
A number of general declarations have been filed in accordance with
treaties which provide for settlement of disputes as to their provisions
by the Court.' In short, the term "state" used in reference to this
claim, has the liberal content which one would expect under the cir-
cumstances. 9
OTHER CLAIMS
The existence of statehood is relevant to a claim to appear before
the Security Council by a nonmember of the United Nations, since
invitations to participate in discussions on a dispute to which the
nonmember is a party are governed by Article 32 of the Charter,
which limits such participation to states. 92 The invitation extended
to the Republic of Indonesia is the most interesting case study here.
Considerable diversity of opinion existed as to whether the Republic of
Indonesia should be invited to participate in the work of the Security
Council concerning the hostilities between Indonesia and the Nether-
190 In accordance with article 22 of the treaty of peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951,
[19521 3 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 3172, 136 U.N.T.S. 46, 72 (1952), general declarations
have been filed by Vietnam, Nov. 5, 1952, 150 U.N.T.S. 147 (1952), which is still
not a member of the United Nations and whose status may be in doubt, by Japan,
Nov. 24, 1951, Ceylon, April 23, 1952, and Cambodia, July 17, 1952, 137 U.N.T.S. 4,
8, 12 (1952), which did not become UN members until 1955 (Ceylon and Cambodia)
and 1956 (Japan), and whose status as states was subject to some controversy at
the time.
191 Ros NxE, op. cit. supra note 183, at 235, observes that "unlike States whose
status as parties to the Statute follows from Articles 3, 4, or 93(2) of the Charter,
statehood of states appearing before the Court under Article 35(2) of the Statute
is not the subject of a preliminary political and binding decision by the General
Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council." He suggests that
their statehood may be challenged, leaving the court with the task of deciding the
question. He extends the doctrine of implied recognition even further by stating
that the court may even be called upon to pass upon the statehood of a state simply
by virtue of exercising the depositary function for these declarations. He declares
that as no specific provisions exist as to the form or emanation of this declaration,
the matter must be presumed to be governed by general international law, according
to which the declaration should come from the head of state or foreign minister of
a recognized state. The more general view would be to consider that the Registrar
of the court possesses no legal discretion, but is performing an administrative function
without prejudice to the incidental issues involved.
192 Article 32 reads: "Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member
of the Security Council or any State which is not a Member of the United Nations,
if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be
invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. ... "
Invitations under article 32 were issued to Albania with regard to the Corfu Channel
incident, SCOR 2d year, 95th meeting 123 (S/247) (1947) and to Jordan concerning
both the Palestine question, SCOR 5th year, 511th meeting 1-2 (S/PV.511) (1950),
and the Israeli-Jordan exchanges of complaints, SCOR 9th year, 670th meeting 13
(S/PV.670) (1954). Yet controversies as to their respective statuses were still
present in relation to the comprehensive claim of admission. At one point, the repre-
sentative of the Arab Higher Committee stated that since the President of the Security
Council (the Ukrainian delegate) had referred to the representative of the Jewish
Agency as the representative of the State of Israel, he would take no further part
in the deliberations. SCOR 3d year, 330th meeting 10 (S/PV.330) (1948).
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lands. 93  The representative of the Netherlands was firmly opposed to
such an invitation, insisting that it would prejudge the issue of state-
hood, which was the very question in dispute. The Republic of
Indonesia was not, he asserted, a sovereign state.' The Australian
delegate thought otherwise." 5 Most significant was the diverse sup-
port '96 to be found for the view of the Indian delegate that there can
be states without full sovereignty which are states for the purposes
of chapter seven of the Charter. 9 ' Ultimately an invitation was issued,
but under no specific rule or article. 9
Claims to appear before the Security Council may also be made
under the terms of Article 35 (2) of the Charter.'99 The complaint
by Hyderabad of Indian aggression 2 00 is the only significant case in
this category. The question arose as to whether it was possible
to invite Hyderabad-whose status as an independent state was very
seriously in doubt-to appear before the Security Council, or indeed,
193 The representatives of both Australia and the U.S.S.R. thought that an invi-
tation should be extended under article 32. SCOR 2d year, 171st meeting 1618, 1627
(S/446/Corr.1) (1947).
194 "The Republic of Indonesia is not a sovereign State any more than the State
of Eastern Indonesia or of Borneo . * . . It is a political entity to be affiliated
ultimately with the two other states I have named, and to be part of a federation.
. . . [It is comparable] to New York, or Utah, or New South Wales ... "
Id. at 1619-20.
195He cited the following factors as proof of statehood: (1) The government
of Indonesia had been recognized by the Netherlands government as exercising de
facto authority over Java, Madura, and Sumatra. (2) The Republic of Indonesia
had been given de facto recognition by a number of other governments, including
the United Kingdom, the United States, India, Australia, and members of the Arab
League. (3) Article XVII of the Linggadjati Agreement provided for the selection
of an arbitration body by the President of the International Court; yet only states
may appear before that court. (4) EcoSoc had passed a resolution with regard to
the ITO, inviting the Indonesian government to the Havana Conference. SCOR 2d
year, 171st meeting 1623-24 (S/446/Corr.1) (1947). These last two points would
appear to be of doubtful validity. To be a party to arbitration arranged by the Presi-
dent of the International Court is not the same as appearing before that court.
Furthermore, participation in the ITO is not restricted to states.
196From the representatives of Australia, China, Syria, United States, and
U.S.S.R
197 SCOR 2d year, 171st meeting 1628 (S/446/Corr.1) (1947).
198 From the discussion that followed it became clear that the Netherlands gov-
ernment thought the invitation was under neither article 32 nor rule 39; Belgium
thought it was based on grounds of equity and justice; while Australia, Poland, and
the U.S.S.R. thought it was based on article 32. Under Rule 39 of the Provisional
Rules of Procedure, the Security Council "may invite members of the Secretariat
or other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with
information or to give it assistance in examining matters within its competence."
Quaere whether representatives of purporting states may be invited under rule 39,
or whether it is only applicable to individuals stricto sensu. The Polish delegate was
of the latter view. SCOR 2d year, 181st meeting 1941-42 (S/487) (1947).
199 "A State which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the
attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which
it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations
of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter."
200 SCOR 3d year, Supp. Sept. 1948, at 5 (S/986) (1948).
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whether the complaint of Hyderabad could even be admitted to the
agenda without prejudging the issue.201 Eventually Hyderabad was
invited to send a representative to appear before the Security Council.
Here it again may be seen that for the purposes for which the term
was invoked, it was thought neither necessary nor desirable to adhere
rigidly to the traditional legal criteria of statehood.
With regard to the General Assembly, neither the Charter nor
the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly provide explicitly for the
participation of nonmember states. However, the status of an entity
may be brought indirectly into issue by virtue of the fact that Article
11 does provide that the Assembly may consider matters brought be-
fore it in accordance with Article 35(2)-whih employs the term
"state." Although no nonmember state has been invited to participate
in the plenary sessions of the General Assembly, certain invitations
have been extended to participate in committees. Invariably caveats
were attached denying implied acknowledgment of statehood. No
clear conclusions can be drawn from an examination of practice under
this head. 2
201 See Eagleton, The Case of Hyderabad Before the Security Council, 44 Am.
J. INe'L L. 277 (1950). The Indian representative stated that Hyderabad is not a
state; that it is not independent; that never in all its history did it have the status
of independence; that neither in the remote past, nor before August 1947, nor under
any declaration made by the United Kingdom, nor under any act passed by the
British Parliament has it acquired the status of independence which would entitle
it to come in its own right to present a case before the Security Council. SCOR
4th year, 425th meeting 2-8 (S/1317) (1949).
202 Reference may be made to the fact that the Arab Higher Committee and the
Jewish Agency for Palestine attended meetings of the First Committee, GAOR 1st
Spec. Sess., 1st Comm. 107-19 (A/C.1/036) (1947). Italy, whose sovereignty may
possibly have been impaired by the armistice arrangements, participated in the Fourth
Committee as administering authority for the trust territory of Somaliland. GAOR
5th Sess., 4th Comm. 195 (A/1294) (1950). Transjordan participated in discussions
on the problem of the establishment of the state of Israel. GAOR 3d Sess., pt 1,
1st Comm. 160 (A/648) (1948). The Republic of Korea has also participated.
GAOR 3d Sess., pt. 1, 1st Comm. Annex 64 (A/1294) (1950). A resolution to
invite representatives of North Korea was rejected, partly on the grounds that neither
the state nor government of North Korea was recognized by the United States. It
is of interest that Article XI of the Genocide Convention provides that the General
Assembly may invite nonmember states to become parties. GAOR 3d Sess., pt. 1,
Resolutions No. 260(111), at 175 (1948). It was pointed out by certain representatives
in the Sixth Committee that to invite all "non-member states" would place the
Secretary General in the very delicate position of having to prepare a list of all the
nonmember states in the world. GAOR 4th Sess., 6th Comm. 450-62 (A/942)
(1949). It was finally decided to invite active members of the specialized agencies
of the United Nations. See GAOR 4th Sess., Plenary, Annex 211 (A/1168) (1949).
As can be seen from the discussion at pp. 1156-61 supra, this does not avoid the
problem of passing on the statehood of the country concerned-it merely delegates
elsewhere the responsibility of making such a decision. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice
pertinently pointed out that the expression "non-member states" meant sovereign,
independent states, responsible for the conduct of their own foreign relations; since
some entities which did not fulfill these conditions might be members of certain
specialized agencies, some amendment or specification was needed. In any event,
Korea, Monaco and Vietnam have become parties to the Genocide Convention, though
they are still not members of the United Nations. GAOR 4th Sess., 6th Comm. 455
(A/942) (1949).
STATEHOOD IN UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE
Other claims which can give rise to the issue of statehood may
also be noted at this juncture. The various regional economic com-
missions of the Economic and Social Council have membership which
includes entities less than full states. However, in each case express
provisions allowing for membership of nonindependent territories
cover the case, and no implication of statehood arises." 3 The func-
tional commissions of EcoSoc normally consist of the representatives
of member states of the United Nations or experts serving in an indi-
vidual capacity; occasionally members of specialized agencies may be
elected to serve, and here again that membership has been open to a
country whose status undoubtedly would be queried were it claiming
full admission to the United Nations. 4
The Secretariat too may find itself faced with an implicit claim to
statehood. Thus under Rule 6 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure
of the Security Council, the Secretary General is required to bring to
the attention of the Council "all communications from States .
concerning any matter for the consideration of the Security Council
in accordance with the provisions of the Charter." 205
Provision has been made for the filing and publication by the
Secretary General of treaties registered under Article 102 of the
Charter. If the Secretary General has any discretion in the matter, he
may be called upon to decide whether an instrument does indeed
emanate from the government of a sovereign state, and is thus a
treaty which warrants registration. A cursory examination reveals
that treaties and agreements to which nonmember states whose very
statehood was in doubt are parties have indeed been registered with
203 Thus the Economic Commission for Africa has Gambia, Kenya, Zanzibar,
Sierra Leone, and Tanganyika as associate members. The Federal Republic of Ger-
many is a full member of the Economic Commission for Europe, and representatives
of the Eastern Zone of Germany participate in a consultative capacity in the work of
ECE's subsidiary organs. The Republics of Korea and Vietnam are members of the
Economic Commission for the Far East.
204 Thus the Federal Republic of Germany was elected to serve on the Technical
Assistance Committee and has also been a member of UNICEF, a special body of
the Economic and Social Council.
205A complaint from Siam prior to her admission to the UN was circulated
under Rule 6. U.N. Doc. No. S/106 (1946). A communication from Hyderabad
was circulated with an attached note from the Secretary General stating that he was
not in a position to determine whether he was required to circulate it under Rule 6.
SCOR 3d year, Supp. Sept. 1948, at 9 (S/1015) (1948). And the Secretary General
has circulated a note from the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea, with a prefa-
tory note stating that it was not a circulation under Rule 6. U.N. Docs. Nos. S/1247,
S/1256 (1949). In short, every possibility has been covered in practice. See REPER-
TOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 1946-1951, at 65 (ST/PSCA/1)
(U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1954.VII.1). For more detailed comments on Secretariat
practice under Rule 6, see Schachter, The Development of International Law Through
the Legal Opinions of the United Nations Secretariat, 25 Berr. YB. INT'L L. 91, 115-22
(1948).
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the Secretariat; 206 but on no occasion has such a treaty been registered
by the nonmember party.
207
CONCLUSION
The real significance of a discussion of the concept of statehood
in United Nations practice can be seen by examining the interaction
between two viewpoints which have been advocated throughout this
Article. Thus the main thesis advocated here is that variations in
United Nations practice concerning claims of statehood are a result
not of an abandonment of traditional legal criteria of statehood but of
the proper use of flexibility in interpreting these criteria in relation to
the claim in which they are presented. 08 Concomitantly, the basic
criteria of population, fixed territory, stable and effective government,
and sovereign independence have been-and should be-followed quite
closely.
The resulting problem can be best seen by reexamining the re-
quirement of independence; more specifically, the problem is illustrated
by the difficulties which arise from the conjunction of a theory that the
criteria of statehood must be observed and the view that actual-rather
than formal-independence is necessary before an entity may properly
be called a state.
206 E.g., Agreement Between New Zealand and Monaco Concerning the Mutual
Abolition of Visas, 171 U.N.T.S. 270 (registered by New Zealand); Agreement
Between the United States and Monaco Relating to Reciprocal Waiver of Passport
Visa Fees for Non-Immigrants, March 31, 1952, 177 U.N.T.S. 194 (registered by
the United States).
207 Rosenne, Recognition of States by the United Nations, 26 BRIT. YB. INT'L L.
437, 444 n.3 (1949), notes that the Linggadjati Agreement signed at Batavia on
March 25, 1947, between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia, was not
submitted by either party for registration. Rosenne suggests that had it been sub-
mitted by Indonesia, which was not a member of the UN, the Secretary General
would have had to exercise a discretion and observes that once the Security Council
had decided to invite the representatives of the Government of Indonesia to its meet-
mngs, it would have been virtually impossible for the Secretary General to refuse
to accept a treaty submitted by the same representative for filing and publication.
The present writer is of the opinion that no discretion exists in this area. See the
caveat appearing prefatory to the United Nations Treaty Series: "Registration of
an instrument submitted by a member state, therefore, does not imply a judgment by
the Secretariat on the nature of the instrument, or the status of a party, or any
similar question."
20S Thus, although there was no doubt that representatives of South Molucca
were both willing and able to appear before the Security Council in connection with
the Indonesian question, and would have been most useful, it was not possible to
issue such an invitation. N.Y. Times, April 25, 1952, p. 22, col. 2; id., Nov. 4,
1952, p. 11, col. 4. Similarly, should an attempt at participation, either limited
or comprehensive, be made by the "Nations of the Iroquois" it could not be enter-
tained. In 1923 an appeal to the League of Nations was presented on behalf of the
"Six Nations of the Iroquois" which sought relief against Canada and which claimed
to be a "state" within the meaning of article 17 of the Covenant. In a letter dated
February 7, 1924, the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada discussed the
status of these Indians and maintained that they could not be regarded as a "state."
Apparently no action was taken by the League. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J.,
7th Ass. 829-42 (1924). See also United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913) ;
Andrews v. State, 192 Misc. 429, 79 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Ct. Cl. 1948), aff'd, 276
App. Div. 814, 93 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1949).
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The stress placed on the requirement of actual independence is
supported not so much by United Nations practice as by its inherent
superiority as a criterion for determining whether an entity should
properly be a subject of international law. Thus it is of no particular
concern either that the formal rhetoric of the discussions of the earlier
years of the United Nations undeniably made use of the concept of
actual independence or that the recent tendency not to examine this
criterion too closely suggests that the stress on actual independence was
merely a convenient contention to make during the hotter stages of the
cold war.
What is important is that policy questions will have to be decided
during the years to come; and in the future-even if this was not so
in the past-the definition of independence will have real relevance.
There would seem to be very good grounds for insisting upon the
importance of actual independence; not only will such a policy keep
more firm the marriage between law and fact, but it will also prevent
certain abuses of the right of popular self-determination which might
otherwise occur. It may, for example, be insufficient to rest satisfied
with the formal announcement of independence granted to a territory
by an ex-colonial power, for if in fact true independence is not also
present, to allow admission to the United Nations may actually per-
petuate the voice of the former colonial power and prevent real self-
determination, though the intended effect was the opposite.
Actual independence is perhaps the most difficult of all the criteria
of statehood to assess correctly; in some cases it may well be im-
possible of objective ascertainment. Consequently, a decision to
concede the existence of "statehood" in regard to any given claim
may have to turn on nonlegal factors. In the hope that these would
be other than arbitrary political acts of self-advancement, it may be
advantageous to enunciate certain policies which should be kept in
mind:
(1) As many entities as possible should be represented on and
participate in the work of a near-universal international organization.
This is especially true in the light of Articles 2(6) and 39, which ex-
tend the scope of adion of the United Nations beyond the immediacy
of its own membership. This policy is also in keeping with changing
trends as to the subjects of international law, the movement being
away from the traditional idea that international law is a legal order
solely relevant to sovereign states.
(2) As many entities as possible should be made responsible to
the world organization, one of whose primary responsibilities is the
maintenance of international peace and security.
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These suggested policies raise a host of related questions, such as
the relative advantages of universality and selectivity. Although
Article 4 of the United Nations Charter rejects the idea of automatic
universality, it was recognized at San Francisco that universality was
"an idea towards which it was proper to aim." 0' The merits and
demerits of universality as both a philosophical and political concept
have been fully argued elsewhere; 210 nor is the experience of the
League of Nations in this matter uninstructive.21 1  Quite apart from
the moral desirability of having entities which may be subject to a
sanctioning process represented on the organ which metes out such
sanctions, we must ask ourselves: Is a near-universal membership-
more specifically, membership of certain politically troublesome en-
tities-liable to lead to a greater conformity with international law?
Nonadmission of a number of countries could lead to the formation
of a rival group of nations outside the United Nations. The collective
security and disarmament arrangements of the United Nations might
well be ameliorated by a more comprehensive participation. On the
other hand, a mechanical addition of members does not always add
to the strength of the association; differing ideologies within one
family may accentuate mistrust, and frequent conflicts within an
organization may weaken or paralyze its functions. While League
experience clearly illustrates that membership per se is no guarantee
of good behavior, by and large it is probably more conducive to peace
to have a potential aggressor within the organization than outside it.
The other member states would then be able to negotiate directly and
immediately; in addition present members might agree to inclusion
from a belief that the membership of a major ally of an opponent
would increase the opportunities for driving a wedge between the
admitted state and its allies or for weakening the support of the
domestic rank and file. Isolation of an entity allows the existing elite
of that country to maintain complete control of communications, and
209 Doc. No. 1178, 1/2/76(2), 7 U.N. CONF. INTL ORG. Docs. 326 (1945).
210 See, e.g., SCHWARZENBERGER, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND WORLD ORDER
(1936) ; Green, Membership in the United Nations, in 2 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS
258 (Keeton & Schwarzenberger eds. 1949).
2 1 1 An Argentinian motion in the League Assembly maintained that "the strength
of the League of Nations depends on its including the greatest possible number of
states." LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., 1st Ass. 234 (1920). The League appeared
to tend towards inclusivity in the hope that standards of behavior could thus be
raised, and often demanded solemn declarations from applicants for admission. Thus
Abyssinia, which was indulging in the slave trade at the time of application in 1923,
was required to sign a declaration adhering to the obligations of the Convention of
St. Germain-en-Laye, Sept. 10, 1919, 8 L.N.T.S. 26 (1922), concerning slave trade,
before she was admitted. LEAGUE OF NATIONS Or. J., 4th Ass. 376 (1923). Many
newly created European states, such as Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania,
were required to sign declarations binding themselves to respect the rights of minorities
within their borders.
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it becomes difficult in the extreme to foster liberalizing elements with-
out substantial international intercourse.
While I would favor policies of maximum representation and
responsibility, the argument that these run the risk of allowing a
country to "blackmail its way into the organization" through adverse
behavior remains a real one. No a priori answer for every applicant
is possible; but with the general policies in mind, each case where the
existence of actual independence is not entirely clear should be exam-
ined and such questions should be asked as: Who has been affected by
a lack of international cooperation? To what extent has the applicant
sought to thwart, or to promote, the objectives of the organization?
What effect has such conduct had on the micropowers and on the
"uncommitted" nations? What kinds of considerations are involved
that would allow the United Nations to forego certain values-such
as a dislike of "moral blackmail"-in order to consolidate others? Are
there historical data available to support the contention that exclusion
fosters isolation? What distinction is to be found between rhetoric
and substantive policy on this issue on the part of the Great Powers?
In addition to universality and promotion of world peace, three
other policies are relevant to the choice to extend or limit admission
to the United Nations and its subordinate organs: the belief that all
peoples have a right to self-determination, the desirability of making
every effort to insure international cooperation in as many fields as
possible, including economic and social fields, and the necessity of
taking all reasonable steps to insure the smooth working of the United
Nations and its various functions.
It must be noted that in certain cases there may be a conflict
among these policies: thus it may be necessary to make a choice be-
tween wider representation of peoples and administrative efficiency.
The final solution may be made easier by the fact that the first three
policy considerations are immediately pertinent to claims to compre-
hensive participation, while claims to limited participation, especially
in organs of a technical character, would seem to indicate that priority
should be given to the last two considerations.
No panacea is offered; at most the suggested policies can provide
guidelines. But if United Nations practice in matters of statehood is
to reveal a purposeful welding of law and politics and is to develop
an emphasis upon true independence, guidelines will be needed.
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